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Summary 
Group living is a widespread phenomenon. One of its assumed advantages is collective 
cognition, the ability of groups to solve cognitive problems that are beyond single 
individuals’ abilities. In this thesis, I investigated whether decision-making improves with 
group size in both humans and fish, thus using the strengths of each system. 
In humans, I tested individual performance in simple quantity estimation tasks and 
a more difficult sentence reconstruction task first alone and then as part of a group. My 
question was whether groups were able to improve not only on average individual 
decisions, but also to beat their best members. Indeed, when a given problem is recurrent 
or too complex for individuals, groups were able to outperform their best members in 
different contexts. Furthermore, I showed that in a simulated predation experiment, 
groups of humans decided to stay or to escape using quorum thresholds based on 
movement behaviour without verbal communication, as has been shown in other animals. 
This simple movement mechanism allowed individuals in groups to simultaneously 
increase true positives and decrease false positives. 
In the guppy, a freshwater fish from Trinidad, I tested in their natural environment 
whether individuals’ ability to distinguish between an edible and a non-edible food item 
increases with group size. My results indicate that guppies had better chances to identify 
the edible food item when part of bigger groups. By investigating several populations 
with different ecological backgrounds, in particular differing in predation levels, I found 
that, despite a lower sampling activity in high predation habitats, predation did not affect 
the improvement of decisions in groups. 
Overall, this thesis contributes to an improved understanding of collective 
decision-making, showing that collective cognition can arise from various interaction 
rules, such as simple aggregation of individual estimates, visual observation of others’ 
movements, and group discussion. Furthermore, having tested problems ranging from 
estimating a quantity, distinguishing between edible and non-edible food items, deciding 
to stay or escape, and reconstructing a distorted message, I showed that grouping with 
others is beneficial in many situations for both humans and fish. This may suggest that the 
underlying mechanisms of collective cognition are remarkably similar across species. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Das Zusammenleben in Gruppen ist im Tierreich ein weit verbreitetes Phänomen. Einer 
der Vorteile des Gruppenlebens könnte die sogenannte „Schwarmintelligenz“ sein, das 
heißt die Fähigkeit von Gruppen kognitive Probleme zu lösen, die die 
Problemlösekompetenz einzelner Individuen übersteigt. In der vorliegenden Dissertation 
untersuchte ich, ob die Gruppengröße beim Menschen und bei Fischen mit einer 
verbesserten Entscheidungsfindung einhergeht.  
Beim Menschen analysierte ich zunächst das Abschneiden von Einzelpersonen, 
die später als Teil einer Gruppe getestet wurden, in einfachen Einschätzungsaufgaben 
sowie komplizierteren Satz-Rekonstruktionstests. Meine Frage war, ob es Individuen in 
Gruppen gelingt bessere Entscheidungen zutreffen als das einem durchschnittlichen 
Individuum der Gruppe alleine möglich wäre und ob Gruppen sogar die Leistung ihres 
besten Mitglieds in den individuellen Tests überbieten könnten. Tatsächlich konnte ich 
zeigen, dass Gruppen die Leistung des besten Mitglieds übertreffen, wenn die 
Problemstellung für Einzelpersonen zu komplex ist oder sich häufig wiederholt. 
Weiterhin gelang mir zu zeigen, dass Gruppen von Menschen bei einer simulierten 
Prädationssituation, ähnlich wie es bereits für andere Tierarten beschrieben wurde, 
anhand von so genannten „Quorum“-Regeln durch non-verbale Kommunikation 
entscheiden, ob sie bleiben oder flüchten. Dabei dienen einfache Bewegungsmuster als 
Schlüsselreiz. Individuen einer Gruppe erhöhen durch diesen Mechanismus gleichzeitig 
ihre echt positiven und verringern ihre falsch positiven Entscheidungen.  
 Beim Guppy, einem Süßwasserfisch aus Trinidad, untersuchte ich in deren 
natürlichem Habitat, ob die Fähigkeit einzelner Individuen zwischen einer genießbaren 
und einer ungenießbaren Futterquelle zu unterscheiden, mit der Gruppengröße ansteigt. 
Meine Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Guppys mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit eine genießbare 
Futterquelle identifizierten, sobald sie Teil einer größeren Gruppe waren. Untersuchungen 
an verschiedenen Populationen, die sich vor allem bezüglich des jeweiligen 
Prädationsdrucks in ihrem Habitat unterschieden, ergaben weiterhin, dass sich, abgesehen 
von einer niedrigeren Sampling-Rate in Habitaten mit hohem Prädationsdruck, Prädation 
nicht auf die Qualität der Gruppenentscheidungen auswirkt. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit trägt zu einem tieferen Verständnis von kollektiver 
Entscheidungsfindung bei. Kollektive Intelligenz entsteht aus verschiedensten 
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Interaktionsregeln, beispielsweise durch die simple Zusammenfassung individueller 
Vorhersagen, visuelle Observation der Bewegung anderer und Gruppendiskussionen. 
Meine Arbeit lässt den Schluss zu, dass bei Problemen wie der Schätzung einer Menge, 
der Unterscheidung zwischen einer genießbaren von einer ungenießbaren Futterquelle, 
der Entscheidung zum Bleiben oder Flüchten und der Rekonstruktion einer Nachricht, die 
Bildung einer Gruppe, sowohl bei Menschen als auch bei Fischen, von Vorteil ist. Diese 
auffallenden Ähnlichkeiten über Artgrenzen hinweg weisen möglicherweise auf sehr 
universelle Mechanismen kollektiver Intelligenz hin. 
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 General introduction 
 
1.1 Collective behaviour 
Collective behaviour is a widespread phenomenon that has long puzzled observers. 
Despite costs such as competition and increased probability of disease transmission, the 
ubiquity of group living across many species reflects the many advantages that it 
provides. Such advantages include antipredator defence, finding a mate, conserving heat 
and water, and reducing the energetic costs of movement (Krause and Ruxton, 2002; 
Sumpter, 2010). 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the naturalist Edmund Selous invoked 
telepathic faculties to explain the ability of flocks to perform fast synchronous changes of 
directions (Couzin, 2009). Now, various models have been developed to help explain the 
underlying mechanisms that allow fish schools and bird flocks to execute the 
synchronized fast group movements and escape manoeuvres. Early models based on 
particle physics used simple rules such as attraction to other individuals, alignment with 
neighbours, and repulsion from individuals that are too close (Breder, 1954; Radakov, 
1973). Some other models known as topological models are based on a fixed number of 
neighbours that interact with the focal individual, regardless of their distance, rather than 
the number of individuals present within a given distance of the focal individual 
(Ballerini et al., 2008). More recently appeared visual models (Strandburg-Peshkin et al., 
2013), in which individuals interact with other individuals that appear in their visual field 
(and occupy an angular area on their retina that is bigger than a threshold value). These 
recent models account for a great flexibility allowing groups to be very compact or very 
loose while maintaining cohesion and effective information transfer between the 
members. Understanding how members interact in a group is important to appreciate how 
information flows between members and enables group decision-making. 
Moving from the interaction mechanisms governing groups, another important 
body of literature deals with understanding the adaptive consequences of group living. 
The dilution effect and the confusion effect, which are respectively a decrease in the 
probability to get caught (proportional with the number of individuals in the group) and 
an increase in the difficulty for the predator to focus on a particular prey in the group 
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(Ioannou et al., 2012) contribute to a better protection against predators for individuals in 
groups.  
Some advantages come from cooperation and division of labour, specialized 
individuals being more effective at their task as has been shown in group-hunting 
dolphins (Gazda et al., 2005), or more commonly known in social insects. 
In addition to group advantages that are mostly due to an increase in physical 
power, being part of large groups can provide advantages at the cognitive level, enabling 
individuals in groups to make better decisions, such as choosing the best navigation route, 
or detecting a predator earlier and from a greater distance through collective vigilance, 
known as the many-eyes effect (Pulliam, 1973), as observed in taxa ranging from water 
skaters (Treherne and Foster, 1980) to birds (Kenward, 1978). 
 
1.2 Collective decision-making 
All organisms, throughout their lives, are faced with many decisions. Whether to forage 
alone or in a group? What to eat? When and where to go? Whom to mate with? Where to 
breed? Etc. Therefore a lot of animal behaviour research investigates questions related to 
choice and decision-making. Decision-making in humans regarding every aspect of their 
life has been contemplated by philosophers since the antiquity. 
 
Collective decision-making in humans 
Owing to the inherent sociality of humans and the importance of decision-making in 
domains such as politics, economics and law, collective decision-making has been widely 
studied in humans. Building on pioneering works by Condorcet (1785) and Galton 
(1907), group decision-making has been studied extensively in humans by psychologists 
and economists (Fernandez-Juricic et al., 2004; Kerr and Tindale, 2004; Laughlin et al., 
2002, 2003; Sunstein, 2005, 2005; Surowiecki, 2004). 
However, collective decision-making has been shown to have limits. Depending 
on the conditions, group decision can either increase or decrease the quality of the 
decision (Esser, 1998; Janis, 1971; Koriat, 2012; Lassila, 2008). Social influence for 
example, by reducing independence, can be detrimental as the bare knowledge of others’ 
opinion may negatively affect the collective outcome, even without communication 
(Lorenz et al., 2011). 
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Recently, collective decision-making in humans has been studied a lot in 
behavioural research with an evolutionary or behavioural ecology focus (Dyer et al., 
2008; King et al., 2011a, 2011b; Krause et al., 2010, 2011b; Kurvers et al., 2014a; Wolf 
et al., 2013). 
 
Collective decision-making in (non-human) animals 
Despite the numerous studies on group decision-making in humans and individual 
decision-making in animals, collective decision-making has long been neglected in 
animals and the number of studies investigating collective decision-making in non-human 
animals increased sharply only recently. 
In many situations, conflicts of interest can arise (for instance, the optimal choice 
for an individual can vary within a group depending on its age, sex, nutritional state, etc). 
In order to maintain cohesion, animals that live in groups need to make consensual 
decisions. But, except from social insects, most animal groups are heterogeneous and it is 
unlikely that all individuals have the same needs at the same time (Conradt, 2011, 2012; 
Conradt and List, 2009, 2009; Conradt and Roper, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010; Conradt 
et al., 2009). 
Collective decision-making can result in benefits (increased vigilance through 
many eyes, faster decision, increased navigational accuracy, self-organized orientation to 
local neighbourhood) but can also present several costs (increased decision time, 
competition, disease transmission, cascade of information). This thesis deals with 
situations where it is in the interest of all members to take the best decision, such as 
escaping from a predator, or deciphering a message. Only chapter 3 may involve some 
level of competition between the members of a group, but all have the same interest in 
making the correct choice.  
 
Collective cognition 
Groups are able to achieve things that individuals cannot and improved decision-making 
is at the root of several of the advantages offered by group-living. For example, water 
skaters, through the many eyes effect, are able to detect predators from a greater distance. 
The many eyes effect is an example of collective cognition and leads to an increase of 
overall vigilance for the group, while allowing a decrease of vigilance at the individual 
level (Treherne and Foster, 1980).  
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Collective cognition is a particular case of collective behaviour that has its origins 
in the fields of complexity and self-organization. It is defined as a process by which “two 
or more individuals independently collect information that is processed through social 
interaction and provides a solution to a cognitive problem that is not available to single 
individuals” (Krause et al., 2010). In short, collective cognition is the ability that groups 
have to solve cognitive problems that are beyond individual capabilities. Depending on 
the field in which it is used, or the organisms studied, collective cognition is also known 
as collective intelligence when used generally on animals (Couzin, 2009), swarm 
intelligence when applied more specifically to social insects or algorithms (Bonabeau et 
al., 1999), the Wisdom of Crowds (Surowiecki, 2004), group decision-making or team 
decision-making in psychology (Kerr and Tindale, 2004; Sunstein, 2005). The expression 
Swarm Intelligence was first coined by Beni & Wang (1989), to describe “systems of 
non-intelligent robots exhibiting collectively intelligent behaviour evident in the ability to 
unpredictably produce ‘specific’ (i.e. not in a statistical sense) ordered patterns of matter 
in the external environment”. The term “collective intelligence” was first applied to 
biological systems by Franks (1989) to describe the ability of ant colonies to solve 
specific problems that appear out of reach for individual ants. It has since then been 
applied not only to other social animals, ranging from bees (Garnier et al., 2007) to 
humans (Krause et al., 2011b), and has even been proposed as a coordination mechanism 
in complex plants roots systems (Baluska et al., 2010). 
Indeed, it has been shown that ants are able to choose the shortest route between a 
food source and their nest using trail pheromone (Goss et al., 1989). Using simple 
quorum rules, accurate decisions are achieved by bees (Seeley et al., 2006; Visscher and 
Camazine, 1999) and ant colonies (Pratt et al., 2002) that are forced to find a new nest 
after being evicted. It has also been shown that speed and accuracy augment with group 
size in fish shoals avoiding a predator model (Sumpter et al., 2008a; Ward et al., 2008, 
2011) 
Collective cognition can be achieved through different mechanisms. In addition to 
benefiting from the possibility to follow a clear leader (Couzin et al., 2005; Danchin et 
al., 2004; Reebs, 2000), being part of the group can also improve decision-making even 
when nobody has clear information (Couzin et al., 2011). For example it has been 
demonstrated that migrating groups use averaging in order to navigate more accurately 
and reach their destination (Codling et al., 2007; Faria et al., 2009; Hancock et al., 2006; 
Wallraff, 1978, 2001). Additionally, group members are still able to distrust a single bad 
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leader leading them close to a dangerous area and need a critical number (Ward et al., 
2011). 
In a group, information is rarely equally distributed among all individuals. 
Individuals may, for example, differ in their proximity to a predator, or in previous 
experience about a food location or a past migration route. Therefore leadership can arise 
in non-hierarchical groups from differences in information. Couzin et al. (2005) predicted 
that a minority of informed members as small as 5 to 10 % is necessary to lead a whole 
group towards the right location. This has been empirically verified by 
Dyer et al. (2008, 2009) using human volunteers. Moreover, recent studies have shown 
that the presence of uninformed individuals in a group not only favours majority 
decisions by counterbalancing despotic tendencies of minorities (Couzin et al., 2011), but 
also improve the stability of the decision-making (Leonard et al., 2011). 
 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
The main aim of my thesis was to investigate whether decision-making improves with 
group size. For this, I compared individual performance with group performance using an 
array of simulation experiments on humans (chapters 2, 4, 5) and a field study on 
Trinidadian guppies, Poecilia reticulata (chapter 3). Using two different systems allowed 
me to investigate collective cognition from different angles, each system presenting its 
own strengths. 
While investigating whether group decisions improve compared to decisions of 
individuals, I was also interested in finding out whether collective decisions can also be 
better than decisions of the best individuals. This is important in order to understand 
whether top performers join groups because of cognitive benefits or because of benefits 
related to other group advantages such as, for example, dilution effect. I tackled this 
question in chapter 2 where I studied groups’ potential performance at solving a 
recurring task, and in chapter 5, where I studied groups’ performance at solving a more 
complex task. Studying humans allowed me to know someone’s private information 
before they acted on it, and before they shared it with other members of the group. This 
allowed delineating private information from social information, which can be difficult 
and time-consuming in animals (because this requires individual testing; therefore, most 
animal studies on collective cognition compared individuals with groups made of 
different individuals that have not been tested as singletons, making it difficult to assess 
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to which extent particular individuals improve when part of a group). Still taking 
advantage of the possibility to know individuals’ decision before and after interaction 
with others, in chapter 4 I studied the ability of groups to improve decisions using a 
design that simulated natural situations and that allowed individuals to interact via 
movement, mimicking the decision process observed in wild animal groups. 
Finally, I wanted to see whether the cognitive benefits observed in human groups 
apply to animals living in natural conditions. Most fundamentally, I was interested in 
exploring ecological selective pressures that may have influenced the evolution of 
collective cognition in wild animals. This is possible by comparing different species or 
different populations and trying to understand how differences in behaviour reflect 
differences in ecology (Davies et al., 2012). In chapter 3, I used the comparative method 
to investigate the effect of predation on collective cognition in Trinidadian guppies. I 
compared the decision improvements in groups across four populations that differed in 
predation pressure, i.e. two with a high predation level, and two with a low predation 
level. Furthermore, in this experiment, the group sizes used occurred naturally and were 
not artificially made by separating already existing groups or putting together unfamiliar 
individuals. 
 
I chose to present the chapters of my thesis following the increasing complexity of 
the interactions between group members, which also reflects the increasing level of 
complexity of the tasks that they had to solve. 
 Chapters 2 and 3 used a simple assessment of collective cognition based on 
decision accuracy. 
It is known that groups generally outperform average individuals at estimation 
tasks. But they are often beaten by one or a few individuals whose estimates are even 
closer to the real value. Chapter 2 explored the advantage of collective cognition 
compared to top performing individuals in solving a task that is cognitively simple, but 
repeatedly encountered over time. In this study, individuals were asked to estimate the 
number of dots that appear on a screen. This estimation task was carried out repeatedly to 
find out how often individuals beat the group. I compared performance of the best 
individuals to group performance obtained from a combination of the estimates given by 
individual members. Depending on the problem that is encountered, the incentive to join 
the group may be strong enough even for the best individual. For example, in the case of 
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predator detection, missing to spot a predator only once can be fatal and joining the group 
is beneficial if such a problem is encountered frequently. 
Chapter 3 extended collective cognition to animal groups in the wild. Testing the 
performance of individuals in various group sizes, I explored the ability of guppies to 
distinguish two stimuli (one edible and the other not) that are visually very similar. This 
experiment was run across several populations to investigate the effect of predation 
pressure on decision-making abilities, and in particular differences in the use of private 
and social information. 
Chapters 4 and 5 took advantage of humans as a study system to investigate 
collective cognition to solve more complex tasks and a possibility to look into the 
collective decision mechanism at a finer level.  
In chapter 4, groups of humans had to repeatedly distinguish between two cryptic 
images in a simulated predation detection experiment in which they were only allowed to 
indicate their preference via movement, in a way that is similar to group decision-making 
observed in some wild animal groups (such as in mammal herds, bird flocks, fish 
schools). 
It is generally difficult to investigate complex problems as the correct solutions are 
not always obvious and most of the previous work on swarm intelligence has been carried 
out on simple estimation tasks. In chapter 5, I explored collective cognition as a tool for 
solving more complicated problems. After listening to a distorted and hardly 
understandable announcement, participants were asked to reconstruct the original 
message individually or as a group, by discussing.  
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 Collectie cognition otential in umans Grous can 
outerform ig-erforming indiiduals 
 
Clément RJG, Krause S, Faria JJ & Krause J 
 
The possibility that individuals in animal groups, including humans, can make collective 
decisions that solve cognitive problems that single individuals cannot solve, or not in the 
same way, has attracted much attention in recent years in the context of collective 
cognition (CC). A common problem when comparing the problem-solving ability of 
groups and single individuals is that many studies only looked at one-off performances 
which makes it difficult to distinguish between individuals of high ability and those that 
made a lucky guess. Here we examined performance profiles of individuals regarding a 
repeated quantity estimation task which demonstrated that there was significant variation 
in cognitive ability within a human population. For a single estimate, 13.4% of 
individuals could beat the group performance. However, if repeated estimates were taken 
into account, then group performance was superior to even the best individual performers 
in the group after a sequence of at least 8 estimates. This result suggests that for certain 
cognitive problems that are encountered repeatedly, joining groups may always be 
advantageous, even for individuals of high cognitive ability. We discuss our results in the 
context of the evolution of collective cognition. 
 
Unpublished manuscript 
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Introduction 
One of the benefits of group living in animals comes from improved decision-making 
resulting from independent information collection and processing among group members 
(Krause et al., 2010). The fact that individuals in groups can solve cognitive problems in a 
way that cannot be implemented by single individuals – a process known as collective 
cognition – has attracted a large amount of interest in several areas (biology: Couzin, 
2009; Krause et al., 2010, psychology: Kerr and Tindale, 2004; Sunstein, 2005; 
sociology: Mathieu et al., 2008; economics: Armstrong, 2001; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 
2004). 
In humans, it has been shown that, for many kinds of problems, the group’s 
collective performance is better than that of an average individual’s (Hong and Page, 
2004; Sunstein, 2005). This phenomenon, known as the “wisdom of crowds” or “many-
wrongs principle” was pointed out as early as 1907 by Galton and seems to play an 
important role in some group formations such as migrating animals (Bergman and 
Donner, 1964; Hamilton, 1967; Simons, 2004; Wallraff, 1978) and several models 
support this hypothesis (Codling et al., 2007; Grünbaum, 1998; Hancock et al., 2006). 
These models are confirmed by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), who showed that homing 
pigeons travel more efficiently in groups than alone and reach their destination faster. 
However, Biro et al. (2006) showed that if the disagreement regarding the route is too 
high, either the group would split or one pigeon would become the leader. In humans, 
when the information is unevenly distributed among the members of a group, 
knowledgeable individuals can still lead the group to the right destination, even without 
communication between members (Dyer et al., 2008, 2009). But when nobody owns 
enough information, the wisdom of crowds plays an important role in reaching the correct 
destination when the group size is large enough and when uncertainty is high (Faria et al., 
2009). Dyer et al. (2008, 2009) showed that even when the information is not evenly 
distributed and only a minority is able to lead, groups of humans still reach their 
destination, even without communication. Some individuals tend to overestimate while 
others underestimate and groups usually outperform individuals because averaging these 
estimations leads to a reduction of the error component (Fischer and Harvey, 1999; 
Simons, 2004). When an objective and demonstrable answer does exist such as estimating 
the temperature of a room, the number of beans in a jar or the ranking of different weights 
(Sunstein, 2005 and references therein), the group’s mean or median answer often comes 
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very close to the real value and is better than the vast majority of individual estimates. 
However, it has been pointed out that the group performance usually did not surpass the 
best individual in a given group and that group processing can actually lead to gains as 
well as losses (Kerr and Tindale, 2004). Very few studies actually reported groups’ 
outcomes that were better than the performance of every member (Kerr and Tindale, 
2004). It is generally considered a truism that groups do better than single individuals, 
since most statistics is based on the assumption that a larger sample size is more likely to 
return an average value closer to the true mean. But this is not always the case. For 
example, Krause et al. (2011) showed that in some cases, as sample size increases, the 
mean becomes worse, and when it comes to decision-making, benefits from grouping 
behaviour are not always high enough to outcompete the best individuals. 
Furthermore, interactions between members of the group do not always improve 
the group’s outcome because of inherent obstacles such as peer pressure or informational 
influence (Lorenz et al., 2011; Sunstein, 2005). Also, Krause et al. (2010) showed that, in 
some cases, groups can even do worse than some particular individuals, for example 
while asked to solve problems in which the answer is highly counterintuitive. Therefore, 
rather than testing swarm intelligence per se, in this experiment we show its potential for 
solving this kind of problem, by removing any direct interaction and considering a 
repeatable situation where individual differences in the ability to solving the problem are 
measurable. 
Group performance has been studied a lot, particularly in humans (Kerr and 
Tindale, 2004; Laughlin et al., 2002, 2006), but a problem with these previous studies is 
that only a single event was considered. It was therefore not possible to tell whether the 
individual who got the best result and beat the group performance was an “expert” at 
doing the task or was just being “lucky”. Experts are characterised by a consistently high 
performance (Shanteau et al., 2002). Our study differs from the previous ones by 
establishing a performance profile over several trials for each individual, enabling us to 
compare the performance of each individual against each other and against groups of 
different sizes. 
A recent model predicted that in single-shot decisions, experts are almost always 
more accurate than the collective across a range of conditions, but that for repeated 
decisions – where individuals are able to consider the success of previous decision 
outcomes – the collective’s aggregated information is almost always superior 
(Katsikopoulos and King, 2010). Our study tested these predictions. We presented 
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students with a set of 10 assessment tasks to quantify differences in personal ability. To 
simulate a kind of problem that could be encountered by an individual in reality, we used 
a simple quantity estimation; i.e. estimating the number of dots on a screen.  We predict 
that when a task is repeated several times, the group eventually outperforms even its best 
members. 
 
Methods 
Data collection 
The experiment was carried out at the University of Applied Sciences Lübeck, Germany, 
in November 2008 and October 2009. All data were collected anonymously and with the 
permission of the participants. Students from different technical disciplines were asked to 
estimate the numbers of dots on 10 pictures each of which was shown on a projection 
screen for 10 seconds. The screen size was 160 × 120 cm and the diameter of each dot 
was 1.2 cm. After a picture with dots was shown the participants had 15 seconds to write 
down their estimate before the next picture was shown. During the time intervals a 
uniformly grey picture was shown. 
All participants saw the same pictures in the same order. Each picture was 
constructed by first picking a random number n in the range 50 … 500 and then randomly 
placing n dots in the visible area of the screen without overlapping. To make the 
estimations more difficult, the dots were not uniformly placed but the probability of a 
position decreased with increasing distance from the centre of the screen (inset of Fig. 
2.1). This prevented participants from simply counting the dots in a small subset of the 
area and then scaling up to obtain the total number. From the 98 answer sheets one was 
excluded from the evaluation because of extremely high and deliberate-looking errors. 
 
Analysis 
Each picture contained a different number of dots. In order to make errors comparable 
between pictures we used relative errors to measure performance. More precisely, for 
each individual i and picture k we defined the individual relative error d(i,k) = | g(i,k) - ck 
| / ck, where g(i,k) was the guess of individual i for picture k, and ck was the correct value 
for picture k. In the same way we defined the collective relative error for picture k as D(k) 
= | meani∈I g(i,k) - ck | / ck, where I was the set of all individuals (N = 97) and meani∈I 
g(i,k) was the mean of the guesses of all individuals in the set I for picture k. 
19 
 
 
Relative error as a function of the correct value 
Do the d(i,k) and D(k) depend on the magnitude of the correct values ck? It might be the 
case that large numbers of objects are more difficult to estimate than small ones even in 
terms of relative errors. This phenomenon is known as the Weber-Fechner law (Dehaene, 
2003; Nieder and Dehaene, 2009). If so, the question arises whether this issue only affects 
the individual relative errors, or both the individual and collective relative errors. To 
investigate these questions we computed the mean individual relative error meani∈I d(i,k) 
for each picture k. Then we conducted regressions with the correct value ck as 
independent variable and meani∈I d(i,k) and D(k) as dependent variables. 
 
Differences in individual ability 
In order to find out whether some individuals consistently performed better than others 
we split the sequences of guesses in two halves, the guesses for pictures 1-5, and the 
guesses for pictures 6-10. For each individual i we computed the sums of relative errors 
for both sub-sequences, Σk=1…5 d(i,k) and Σk=6…10 d(i,k), and determined their correlation. 
A significant correlation would be indicative of individual consistency. The d(i,k) tended 
to increase with increasing correct value ck (see results section). Therefore, it seemed 
problematic to regard these error sums as measurements at interval scale or ratio scale 
level. However, the error sums certainly provide a measurement at an ordinal scale level 
and it made sense to use a rank correlation coefficient. Here we used Kendall’s τ, mainly 
because it has a simple and intuitive interpretation. 
 
Individual performance vs. collective performance 
We compared individual and collective performance across (subsets of) the 10 pictures by 
comparing their cumulative errors. We computed the cumulative error for a subset S of 
the 10 pictures by summing up the errors for all pictures in S. More precisely, the 
cumulative error of individual i on a subset S of pictures was defined by Σk∈S d(i,k), and 
the cumulative collective error on S was Σk∈S D(k). For example, if S contained the 
pictures 1, 4, and 5, then the cumulative error of individual i on S was d(i,1) + d(i,4) + 
d(i,5) and the cumulative collective error on S was D(1) + D(4) + D(5). 
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For most single pictures some individuals outperformed the group (i.e. d(i,k) < 
D(k) for some individuals i and pictures k). On average, 13 individuals had a smaller error 
than the group for a given picture. However, regarding the cumulative error on the set of 
all 10 pictures no individual was better than the group. The question arose about what 
happens in between these extreme scenarios for intermediate numbers of estimates. To 
answer this question we compared the individual and the collective cumulative errors on 
subsets of pictures. For each subset we counted the number of individuals with smaller 
cumulative error than the group. In order to determine if and how this number decreases 
with increasing size of the subset we did this for all 210 - 1 non-empty subsets of pictures. 
 
Additionally, to assess the influence of differences in individual abilities on the 
number of individuals that perform better than the group on subsets of pictures, we 
randomised the guesses across the individuals. More precisely, for each picture we 
permuted all guesses and performed the above described computations for all non-empty 
subsets of pictures. We repeated these steps 100,000 times to approximate the probability 
distribution of the number of individuals that outperform the group for each size of 
subsets of pictures in a null model where all individuals have the same abilities. 
Statistical analyses were performed using R version 2.10.1. 
 
Results 
Relative error as a function of the correct value 
The mean individual relative error increased with the magnitude of the correct value ck 
(Linear regression: F1,8 = 21.15, P = 0.002, R² = 0.726; Fig. 2.1), while the collective 
relative error did not increase (F1,8 = 0.41, P = 0.54, R² = 0.048; Fig. 2.1). The individual 
relative errors increased linearly (rather than exponentially as would be expected if 
following a Weber-Fechner law; Fig. 2.1). The collective relative error did not increase 
probably because the ratio of guesses that underestimated to guesses that overestimated 
the correct values was roughly the same regardless of the correct value. 
 
Differences in individual ability 
Individual performance on the two halves (two sets of 5) of pictures was significantly 
correlated (Kendall’s tau: τ = 0.43, zτ = 6.30, P < 0.001) indicating that there were strong 
inter-individual differences in estimation performance. From the τ value we could 
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conclude that an individual i1 that performed better than an individual i2 on the first half 
of 5 pictures would also perform better than i2 on the second half of 5 pictures with a 
probability of approximately 72%. 
 
Individual performance vs. collective performance 
The cumulative collective error on the set of all pictures was 1.08 whereas the cumulative 
errors of individuals were much larger and ranged from 1.73 (best performer among the 
97 individuals) to 22.36. The evaluation of observed cumulative errors on subsets of 
pictures showed that the number of individuals that performed better than the group 
decreased exponentially with increasing size of the subset showing that even the strongest 
individual performer could not beat the group after 8 attempts (Fig. 2.2). The mean 
numbers extracted from the null model also decreased exponentially but were 
significantly smaller than the observed ones as can be seen from the 95% confidence 
interval (Fig. 2.2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Mean individual error (black squares) and collective error (grey circles) on 
single pictures as a function of the correct value. The black bars indicate the interval that 
covers approximately 66% of individual errors that are smaller than the mean. We used 
this range rather than the standard error because of the highly asymmetric nature of the 
distributions. Inset: Example of the pictures shown to the participants. 
 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 100 200 300 400 500
A
b
s
o
lu
te
 v
a
lu
e
 o
f 
r
e
la
ti
v
e
 e
r
r
o
r
Correct value
22 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Percentage of individuals that outperform the group as a function of the size 
of the subset of pictures (black bars). After 8 guesses no individual in the data set was 
capable of beating the collective guess. For comparison the performance of the group is 
shown after removing individual performance differences from the data set (grey bars 
with 95% confidence intervals). 
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Discussion 
Our results show that, although individual relative error increases as the correct value 
increases, the collective relative error remains constant. One novel aspect of this study 
lies in the use of repeated trials by the individuals, allowing us to establish individual 
profiles, which showed a significant inter-individual variation. But despite this variation, 
the group performance beats even the best individual after 8 guesses. These results are a 
strong indication that the swarm intelligence potential of the group becomes particularly 
important when the same, or at least similar, cognitive problems are encountered more 
frequently. In contrast 13.4 % of individuals could beat the group for a single guess. 
This result suggests that experiments in which groups were not able to beat the 
best individual members (Kerr and Tindale, 2004; Mathieu et al., 2008; Sunstein, 2005) 
used sample sizes that were either too small to provide a good collective guess or the lack 
of repeated trials may have given a false impression of individual quality. There are, 
however studies which found that even relatively small groups (of 3-5 members) can 
outperform their best members for some kinds of problems (Clément et al., 2013; 
Laughlin et al., 2002, 2006). These are tasks in which groups achieve qualitatively better 
solutions to complex problems where a connection between letters and numbers need to 
be made and which required the development of equations. The mechanism, however, by 
which groups achieved this superior performance remains largely unclear. We conclude 
that simple estimation tasks (like the one investigated in this paper) require repeat 
performances to reliably assess the performance level of groups and single individuals 
whereas highly complex cognitive tasks can already show up a performance difference 
between groups and the best individuals in single trials. 
What do these results tell us about the evolution of grouping via collective 
cognition? The results of our study indicate that the CC-benefit of group membership 
accumulates over time with repeat performances. Laughlin et al. (2002) suggests that an 
instant benefit of making even just a single decision in a relatively small group can be 
obtained in the case of complex problems. It would be interesting to see whether 
Laughlin’s approach can be modified for use with species that are known for their 
cognitive abilities such as non-human primates or cetaceans. 
Our results indicated in our scenario how often a cognitive problem needed to 
occur for the group to achieve higher performance levels than the best individual. But 
another important consideration is of course the fitness benefit that would be associated 
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with this higher performance level. This benefit would depend on how important the 
cognitive problem in question is and how frequently the individuals encounter this type of 
problem. If the problem occurs very frequently, then even a small fitness benefit may add 
up over the life-time of the animals (Davies et al., 2012). However, if the problem occurs 
only rarely, then we should expect it to be an important one if it is to lead to the evolution 
of grouping via CC. Finally we also need to consider the potential costs of grouping, such 
as competition (Krause and Ruxton, 2002), relative to any benefits before we can predict 
whether factors such as CC could lead to the evolution of grouping.  
Research studies on cognitive abilities in animals and humans show strong 
evidence for inter-individual variation (Bell et al., 2009; Dall et al., 2004; Deary et al., 
2010; Healy et al., 2009; Sih et al., 2004a, 2004b). However, it remains a considerable 
challenge to predict the collective performance of groups that are composed of 
individuals of different cognitive abilities. Different outcomes are possible depending on 
the group composition and the information processing rules (Krause et al., 2010). This is 
a promising avenue for future research that takes personality differences in animals into 
account when looking at collective decision-making and swarm intelligence in particular. 
If all individuals greatly benefit from overcoming their cognitive limitations 
through CC in groups, mechanisms that favour group formation and maintenance are 
likely to have evolved. However, what about a population in which a few (very good) 
individuals might not benefit greatly from being in a group (regarding decision-making) 
whereas the majority would? If some individuals are superior decision-makers, they 
might do better staying mostly alone and thereby reduce competition costs. For example, 
regarding more traditional grouping benefits, if living in groups has evolved because of 
the many-eyes effect (Krause and Ruxton, 2002), and one individual is “super aware”, 
then it might be expected to spend less time in groups because the costs (competition for 
example) are likely to outweigh the benefits (in terms of spotting predators). In the 
context of cognitive problem solving, we could potentially have the emergence of two 
strategies such as low cognitive performers that are highly gregarious and high cognitive 
performers that are largely solitary, provided that they have equal fitness. Potentially 
there could even be a strategy continuum whereby individuals of different cognitive 
abilities use CC to different degrees. It would then be interesting to test whether 
individuals with lower cognitive abilities demonstrate higher grouping tendency than 
individuals with higher abilities and if this relationship is affected by the type of problem 
encountered. Another important consideration in this context is that the development and 
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maintenance of neural tissues is very expensive (Laughlin et al., 1998). Therefore swarm 
intelligence might often be the energetically cheapest option to solve cognitive problems. 
In this experiment, the individuals did not exchange any information while 
making the decision. In humans, direct interactions are not always required for swarm 
intelligence because, once we know how the information should be processed, we can use 
a computer algorithm to do the job (Krause et al., 2010; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). In 
fact there is some indication in the psychological literature that real interactions between 
individuals can be detrimental to the swarm intelligence potential of groups because of 
communication barriers between them (Mathieu et al., 2008; Sunstein, 2005). Therefore, 
at least for this range of problems, aggregating the estimates from each individual instead 
of allowing the members to communicate with each other is the safest solution to 
guarantee the quality of the decision.  
One aspect we have neglected so far is the question of how the performance of the 
group depends on group size. Unfortunately this was beyond the scope of our study 
because we only had 97 individuals. To assess the performance potential of different 
group sizes one would need a dataset of many more individuals and their responses, to 
randomly draw groups of different sizes and investigate their performance relative to that 
of the best group member. Statistical textbooks (for example, Dorofeev and Grant, 2006) 
generally give the advice that a correction factor has to be taken into account when 
sample sizes are greater than 5% of the population. This suggests that the pool from 
which samples can safely be drawn for the above purpose needs to be at least 20 times 
larger than the largest sample size. Therefore, if we want to examine the performance of 
groups up to size 50, we would need a minimum of 1000 individuals in our study. 
Experimental work on sparrows, Passer domesticus, showed that larger groups were more 
successful in solving cognitive problems (Liker and Bókony, 2009). However, they 
compared groups of 6 birds with those containing 2 birds and did not include single 
animals. The latter would be valuable in terms of understanding the evolution of grouping 
via cognitive benefits in groups which remains an interesting field for future research. 
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! Collectie cognition in guies a cross-oulation 
comarison study in te wild 
 
Clément RJG, Mann RP, Ward AJW, Kurvers RHJM, Ramnarine IW & Krause J 
 
Collective cognition has received much attention in recent years but most of the empirical 
work has focused on the increase of decision-performance with group size in single 
populations. Here we investigated collective cognition in multiple populations that are 
subject to different ecological conditions. Guppies (Poecilia reticulata) were given a 
simultaneous choice between an edible and a non-edible stimulus. We quantified the 
response of fish to the test stimuli in various group sizes across four populations that 
differed in predation risk. Our results show that sampling activity was higher in low 
predation populations compared to high ones but not affected by group size or sex. 
Decision accuracy increased with group size and with sampling activity of the focal 
individual, i.e. individuals that sampled more, and individuals in larger groups had a 
higher approach and peck accuracy. Group size had a significant positive effect on the 
probability that the first approach was made towards the edible stimulus but not on the 
accuracy of the first peck. Our results suggest that the use of private information (direct 
personal sampling) and social information (observing other group members) is context-
dependent in guppies and differences in predation regimes only influenced sampling 
activity but not decision accuracy. 
 
Unpublished manuscript 
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Introduction 
Sociality confers many advantages to animals, such as better anti-predator defence or 
spotting food (Krause and Ruxton, 2002). Many of these advantages result from 
collective cognition, which is the ability of members of groups to make decisions that are 
better than those made by single individuals (Krause et al., 2010).  
Animals often gain advantage from paying attention to cues that are inadvertently 
displayed by their conspecifics, using this social information to complement their own 
information in order to make better decisions (Danchin et al., 2004). For example, rats 
infer from their congeners’ breath whether some food is safe or not to consume (Galef, 
1991), whereas starlings observe foraging success of their flockmates to assess the quality 
of a food patch (Templeton and Giraldeau, 1995). Social information is also used by 
social animals to make collective decisions based on quorum thresholds. For instance 
shoals of stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus) use quorum thresholds to evaluate 
predation risk (Ward et al., 2008) or to locate foraging patches (Ward et al., 2012). 
Similarly, ant colonies that are forced to emigrate from their nest are able to choose the 
best available new nest by accelerating the recruitment process once a threshold number 
of ants have made a decision in favour of a particular location (Pratt et al., 2002; Sumpter 
and Pratt, 2009). It was also shown in fish shoals that the speed and the accuracy of 
decisions increased with group size (Ward et al., 2011). 
One important selection pressure affecting the use of social information is thought 
to be predation risk (Devereux et al., 2006; Elgar, 1989). For example, experimentally 
increasing the perceived risk of predation in the lab resulted in an increased reliance on 
social information in Minnows (Phoxinus phoxinus) due to increased cost of gathering 
private information (Webster and Laland, 2008). Three-spined sticklebacks (Gasterosteus 
aculeatus) have a thick body armour making it less risky to collect private information, as 
compared to the sympatrically occurring nine-spined sticklebacks (Pungitius pungitius), 
which lack this armour and are more vulnerable to predation and more prone to using 
social information (van Bergen et al., 2004; Coolen et al., 2003, 2005). Furthermore, it 
has been shown that predation risk can influence social structure of animal groups (Kelley 
et al., 2011), possibly affecting information transfer, and therefore social learning. 
However, a largely unresolved question is how individuals from populations under 
different predation regimes in the wild differ in their use of private versus social 
information. 
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Many fish species feed on objects falling into the water, and individuals have to 
respond quickly to a stimulus and consume it before others do (Krause, 1993). However, 
not every fallen object is edible and the fish will often approach objects that they cannot 
consume at the cost of wasting energy, missing simultaneously occurring and genuine 
feeding opportunities, and exposing themselves to predation (Hall et al., 2013; Ioannou 
and Krause, 2009).  
In many natural situations, timing matters, and little differences can lead to 
different outcomes among conspecifics. For example, detecting and responding to a 
predator earlier increases the chance of survival, while predators focus on individuals that 
react more slowly (Kenward, 1978; Post et al., 2013). Similarly, in a foraging context, 
being part of a group implies competing with other members when the food is limited and 
a rapid response to opportunities can increase food intake. For example one might benefit 
from social information about a fallen object by watching how the others react to it, but a 
delayed response may mean a missed opportunity. Authors previously looked at single 
populations in the context of decision accuracy (Sumpter et al., 2008a; Ward et al., 2008, 
2012). Here we used the comparative approach to investigate groups of free-ranging 
guppies from four different populations facing different predation regimes to study the 
effects of predation risk on the evolution of collective cognition. 
We studied the effects of group size and predation level on decision accuracy by 
presenting fish simultaneously with an edible and a (similar looking) non-edible item. We 
quantified how frequently the edible and the non-edible stimuli were targeted as a 
measure of decision accuracy. Furthermore, we quantified general sampling activity of 
individuals as a proxy of their level of private information. We studied how group size 
and predation level affected this sampling activity, and how sampling activity, in turn, 
affected decision accuracy. 
Carotenoid pigments have been shown to confer health benefits (Kolluru et al., 
2006). They are sequestered for use in courtship displays by male guppies (Kodric-
Brown, 1989), thus also conferring fitness benefits. They cannot be synthesised by 
guppies and must be obtained through their diet (Fox, 1976). They are present in orange 
and red fruits that are abundant in the rainforest and often end up in the streambed, where 
they are very attractive to guppies, both males and females (Rodd et al., 2002). However, 
at the same time the streambed usually contains many other reddish objects including 
pebbles that are non-edible. We therefore presented edible and non-edible stimuli made 
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out of red materials that resemble each other to single fish and shoals of various sizes and 
evaluated the decision accuracy as a function of group size. 
Due to the anti-predator effects of group-living, sampling is usually safer for 
individuals in larger groups (Krause and Ruxton, 2002). We therefore predicted that i) 
sampling activity would be positively correlated with group size. Given that sampling 
should be safer in lower predation sites we also predicted that ii) sampling activity is 
greater in low predation sites than in high predation sites. Finally, we expected that iii) 
decision accuracy would be positively correlated with group size, as predicted by 
previous work (Ward et al., 2008, 2011). 
 
Methods 
Experimental setup 
The study took place in the Turure River (lower: 10°39’27”N, 61°9’48”W; upper: 
10°41’7”N, 61°10’23”W) and the Aripo River (lower: 10°39’1”N, 61°13’26”W; upper: 
10°40’55”N, 61°13’51”W) in Trinidad (March 2013, 2014 & 2015). These rivers consist 
of interconnected pools inhabited by different-sized guppy populations (Poecilia 
reticulata). Both streams are known to have a sharp gradient in predation pressure: in the 
lower sections (below the main falls) characids and cichlids are present, which heavily 
predate on guppies. These predators are absent in the upper sections (above the main 
falls) (Magurran, 2005). This provides a unique opportunity to use a natural gradient in 
predation pressure to investigate its effect on collective cognition. We sampled 
populations from below and above the main falls in both rivers.  
Individuals from our target populations are known to respond strongly to orange 
and red items falling on the water surface (usually these are edible fruits dropping from 
trees into the stream). Therefore, an edible stimulus and a non-edible stimulus were made 
out of red material. The edible stimulus was a piece of red bell pepper and the non-edible 
stimulus was cut out of red plastic. Both stimuli had the same shape (9*5*2 mm) and 
each was fixed to a weighted monofilament line (40 cm long, ø 0.2 mm) attached to the 
end of a wooden rod, 20 cm apart from each other. We first conducted pilot trials to 
verify that both stimuli were effective with fish in the wild when presented in isolation 
(mean ± SE number of approaches towards the edible stimulus: 4.1 ± 0.5 (n = 30), 
towards the non-edible stimulus: 2.6 ± 0.4 (n = 37); mean ± SE number of pecks at the 
edible stimulus: 3.7 ± 1.0, at the non-edible stimulus: 1.6 ± 0.5). 
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Before the start of each trial we counted the number of guppies present in the 
selected group and randomly selected one individual as focal individual (because often, 
the fish would travel beyond the field of the camera, making problematic the recording of 
entire groups) of which we determined sex and size class (small/middle/large). Both 
stimuli were then slowly and simultaneously lowered into the water approximately 
equidistant from the focal individual (and whenever possible also equidistant from the 
whole group). Trials lasted 2 minutes following the introduction of the stimuli, giving the 
fish sufficient time to inspect the stimuli (although our main results did not change when 
considering shorter time periods (down to 30 s)). We scored the number of approaches 
and pecks made by the focal individual towards the edible and the non-edible stimuli. An 
approach was defined as the focal individual moving towards the stimulus within one 
body length from it and a peck was defined as the focal individual biting or nibbling the 
stimulus. A peck always followed either an approach or a previous peck whereas an 
approach was not necessarily followed by a peck. In total 607 trials were conducted, 
testing fish in group sizes ranging from 1 to 72 (mean group size = 6.2). Each trial was 
carried out in a different location along both streams and it is thus highly unlikely that the 
same groups and the same individuals were tested twice. 
 
 
Analysis 
We first investigated the effect of group size and predation level on sampling activity. For 
each randomly selected individual, we quantified every approach and peck toward each 
stimulus. To account for the high number of zeros in our data, we looked at the sampling 
activity using a hurdle model (count model with truncated negative binomial distribution 
and log link, zero hurdle model with binomial distribution and logit link) with group size, 
predation level, interaction between group size and predation level, river, size and sex as 
explanatory variables. We used likelihood ratio tests to compare the different models. We 
ran different models for approaches and pecks as they reflect qualitatively different 
decision processes despite both indicating a level of interest towards the stimuli. 
We then studied decision accuracy, using the ratio (edible / (edible + non-edible)) 
as a measure of decision accuracy separating again approaches and pecks. We used this 
ratio as response variable in a generalized linear model with sampling activity (sum of 
approaches and pecks), group size, interaction between activity and group size, predation 
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level, river, size and sex as explanatory variables. We used binomial errors and a logit-
link function since the response variable was bound between zero and one (with 0 
indicating that all approaches/pecks were towards the non-edible stimulus, and 1 
indicating that all approaches/pecks were towards the edible stimulus). 
Finally, to minimize the effect of sampling activity and focus on the effect of 
group size, we also looked at the first decision made (i.e. first approach and first peck). 
 
 
Results 
Sampling activity 
The number of approaches was not affected by group size (Fig. 3.1; count model: ² = 
0.02, df = 1, p = 0.89). However, there was a significant effect of predation level (Fig. 
3.1; count model: ² = 7.15, df = 1, p = 0.008; zero hurdle model: ² = 2.66, df = 1, p = 
0.10), with fish in low predation areas approaching both types of stimuli more often than 
fish in high predation area. There was no significant interaction effect between group size 
and predation level (count model: ² = 0.22, df = 2, p = 0.90). There was also a 
significant difference between the two rivers (Fig. 3.1; count model: ² = 12.52, df = 1, p 
< 0.001; zero hurdle model: ² = 11.41, df = 1, p < 0.001), with fish in the Turure River 
being more likely to approach, and approaching more often than fish in the Aripo River. 
There was no effect of sex (count model: ² = 1.23, df = 1, p = 0.27) but there was an 
effect of the size of focal fish (Fig. 3.1; count model: ² = 4.31, df = 1, p = 0.032; zero 
hurdle model: ² = 7.27, df = 1, p = 0.007), with larger fish being more likely to approach 
both types of stimuli, and approaching them more often than smaller fish. 
Group size did also not affect the number of pecks (Fig. 3.1; count model: ² = 
1.08, df = 1, p = 0.30). There was, again, a significant effect of predation level (Fig. 3.1; 
count model: ² = 14.54, df = 1, p < 0.001; zero hurdle model: ² = 3.42, df = 1, p = 
0.064), with fish in low predation areas pecking at both types of stimuli more often than 
fish in high predation areas. There was also no significant interaction effect between 
group size and predation level (count model: ² = 1.60, df = 2, p = 0.45). There was no 
significant difference between the two rivers (Fig. 3.1; count model: ² = 2.70, df = , p = 
0.10). There was no effect of sex (count model: ² = 0.96, df = 1, p = 0.33) but there was 
an effect of the size of focal fish (Fig. 3.1; count model: ² = 5.01, df = 1, p = 0.025; zero 
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hurdle model: ² = 29.13, df = 1, p < 0.001), with larger fish being more likely to peck, 
and pecking more often than smaller fish. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Sampling activity is greater in low predation sites (upper parts of the rivers) 
than in high predation sites (lower parts of rivers). It is also greater for larger individuals 
than smaller ones. Additionally, it is greater in the Turure River than in the Aripo River. 
Shown are medians and interquartile ranges. Data points outside 1.5 times the 
interquartile ranges are displayed separately. 
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Decision accuracy 
The accuracy of approaches was affected both by sampling activity (Fig. 3.2a; glm: ² = 
35.41, df = 1, p < 0.001) and by group size (Fig. 3.2b; ² = 16.61, df = 1, p < 0.001). 
Individuals which sampled more, and individuals in larger groups had a higher approach 
accuracy. There was no significant effect of interaction between sampling activity and 
group size on the accuracy of approaches (² = 1.11, df = 1, p = 0.29). The accuracy of 
pecks was also affected both by sampling activity (Fig. 3.2a; glm: ² = 22.23, df = 1, p < 
0.001) and by group size (Fig. 3.2b; ² = 6.13, df = 1, p = 0.013), with individuals with a 
higher sampling activity and individuals in larger groups having a higher pecking 
accuracy. There was no significant effect of interaction between sampling activity and 
group size on the accuracy of approaches (² = 0.08, df = 1, p = 0.77). Both for 
approaches and for pecks, there was no significant effect of predation level, river, size 
and sex. When using a different measure of decision accuracy, the so-called sensitivity 
index which combines the true and false positive rate of a decision maker and is widely 
used in signal detection theory (Macmillan and Creelman, 2004), we obtained 
quantitatively similar results.  
 
First choice 
Group size had a significant positive effect on the probability that the first approach is 
made towards the edible stimulus (glm: ² = 11.53, df = 1, p < 0.001). However, no effect 
of group size was found on the probability that the first peck is made towards the edible 
stimulus (glm: ² = 1.48, df = 1, p = 0.22). 
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Discussion 
We found no correlation between sampling activity and group size. However, sampling 
activity was higher in low predation sites as predicted. Decision accuracy increased both 
with group size and sampling activity. Interestingly, we found no effect of predation level 
on decision accuracy, despite a higher sampling activity in low-predation sites. 
Sampling activity was affected by several variables. It was greater in low 
predation habitats, which harbour fewer and smaller predator species (Magurran, 2005). 
This suggests that guppies were prone to spend more time and energy to individually 
sample potential food in low predation sites. However, we found no evidence of sampling 
activity being group-size-dependent in high-predation habitats; we had expected 
individuals to sample more when in bigger groups due to social facilitation and 
competition. Sampling activity was also greater for larger individuals, which are less at 
risk of being eaten by gape-limited predators (Croft et al., 2006; Mattingly and Butler, 
1994). However, the effect of individual size on sampling activity did not translate into an 
effect on accuracy. Sex of the focal individual affected neither its sampling activity nor its 
accuracy, confirming that both sexes are attracted to carotenoids (Rodd et al., 2002) and 
not just exclusively males. Sampling activity was higher in the Turure River than in the 
Aripo River, which might be explained by ecological differences such as differences in 
the availability of carotenoids. This would be an interesting issue to explore in future 
studies. 
Decision accuracy increased both with sampling activity and group size, 
confirming previous studies (e.g. (Brown and Laland, 2003; Brown et al., 2006; Liker and 
Bókony, 2009; Sumpter et al., 2008a; Warburton, 2003; Ward et al., 2008, 2012)). 
Surprisingly, predation level had no effect on decision accuracy, despite its effect on 
sampling activity. We can only speculate that under different predation regimes, private 
information and social information are used differently but lead to the same decision 
quality. Concerning the first decision made (before any private information had been 
gathered), the probability that the first approach was directed toward the edible stimulus 
increased with group size, suggesting that guppies used the behaviour of conspecifics in 
their choice of which stimulus to approach first. This result is consistent with previous 
work showing that ninespine sticklebacks (Pungitius pungitius) rely on the presence and 
feeding rate of their conspecifics to decide on which food patch to approach (Coolen et 
al., 2005; Webster and Laland, 2013), and with studies on gaze following which indicate 
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that social information strongly guides individual attention in humans (Gallup et al., 
2012). However, the first peck was not influenced by group size, which suggests a 
different underlying mechanism for this decision. 
In our study, individuals experienced two stimuli at the same time and made their 
decision over a time period that allowed individuals to sample both stimuli, contrary to 
other studies on group decision-making that usually involve the detection of a single 
stimulus (e.g. a predator (Ward et al., 2008) or a shaded area (Berdahl et al., 2013)) 
within a short period of a few seconds which is too brief for individuals to explore all 
available options (but see Miller et al., 2013). In our study, sampling activity was an 
important part of the decision process and this enabled us to quantify this factor as a 
proxy for private information that is available to individuals. The use of social 
information was inferred from a positive correlation between decision accuracy and group 
size in the absence of any increase in sampling activity (private information) with group 
size, and from our data showing a group size trend for first-choice approach (towards the 
edible stimulus).  
Previous studies have shown that individuals in groups can outperform single 
individuals at cognitive tasks, such as detecting and avoiding predators and detecting food 
patches (Cresswell, 1994; Kenward, 1978; Krause and Ruxton, 2002; Lima, 1994, 1995a; 
Ward et al., 2008, 2011). The present study is novel as it shows collective cognition in 
multiple populations that are subject to different ecological conditions. We found that 
both private and social information contribute to decision accuracy but we were not able 
to separate out their relative contribution which might be an exciting field for future 
studies (see Arganda et al. (2012) for a lab study). Our results on first approach and first 
peck do show, however, that the use of private and social information appears to be 
context-dependent. 
 
 
Ethics statement: This research was performed in accordance with the laws, guidelines 
and ethical standards of the country in which they were performed (Trinidad). 
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" #nformation transmission ia moement $eaiour 
imroes decision accuracy in uman grous 
 
Clément RJG, Wolf M, Snijders L, Krause J & Kurvers RHJM 
 
A major advantage of group living is increased decision accuracy. In animal groups 
information is often transmitted via movement. For example, an individual quickly 
moving away from its group may indicate approaching predators. However, individuals 
also make mistakes which can initiate information cascades. How responsive should 
individuals then be to escaping group members? Increasing responsiveness increases true 
positives (i.e. escape when a predator is present) but at the cost of increased false 
positives (i.e. escape when a predator is absent). Conversely, reducing responsiveness 
decreases not only false positives but also true positives, resulting in a fundamental trade-
off in decision accuracy. Here we investigated how socially responsive individuals are to 
information transmission via movement: a gradual mechanism of information 
transmission abundant in nature. We performed a simulated predator detection task using 
human groups in which humans stepped forward if they wanted to escape. We confirm 
that this simple movement mechanism allows individuals in groups to simultaneously 
increase true positives and decrease false positives. The increase in the number of 
escapees over time during collective decisions depended on the personal information of 
the group members: Individual predator detection by only a few group members rarely 
resulted in anyone stepping forward. Individual predator detection by a quarter of the 
group often resulted in the entire group escaping. Finally, individual predator detection by 
at least half of the group led to a rapid escape of the whole group. Overall, the increase in 
the number of escapees over time followed a linear response. Since information 
transmission via movement is widespread in animal groups, this mechanism is expected 
to be relevant for many animal groups to improve decision accuracy. 
 
Animal Behaviour 105: 85-93, 2015 
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Introduction 
Group living has evolved owing to the many advantages it provides to the individuals that 
are part of a collective, such as increased safety and increased opportunities for detecting 
food or finding mates (Krause and Ruxton, 2002; Sumpter, 2010). Such advantages often 
result from the ability of groups to achieve higher decision accuracy than single 
individuals (Clément et al., 2013; Conradt and List, 2009; Ward et al., 2011). 
Animal groups frequently need to make consensus decisions in order to maintain 
group cohesion and its associated benefits and, in many cases, the information exchange 
underlying these decisions takes place via movement (Conradt and Roper, 2003; Miller et 
al., 2013; Strandburg-Peshkin et al., 2013). For example, in fish shoals and bird flocks, an 
individual moving away from the group indicates to the others its intention to change 
direction or leave a current location (Beauchamp and Ruxton, 2007; Radakov, 1973). 
Changes in speed and direction are often the primary ways of information transmission in 
large groups (Handegard et al., 2012; Katz et al., 2011; Sumpter et al., 2008b). Although 
verbal communication often plays a crucial role in humans, movement alone can also 
serve as the sole cue in everyday human interactions, as observed in pedestrians at road 
crossings, where individuals are more likely to jaywalk after seeing another individual 
doing so (Faria et al., 2010a). 
Individuals moving in a given direction can thus provide information to their 
group members, which can increase collective accuracy (Berdahl et al., 2013; Lazarus, 
1979; Treherne and Foster, 1981; Ward et al., 2011). In situations involving predation 
risk, for example, a sudden movement away from the group by some individuals usually 
indicates the presence of a predator, as shown in fish schools and bird flocks, and can 
trigger the reaction of the whole group (Cresswell, 1994; Hingee and Magrath, 2009; 
Kenward, 1978; Lima, 1994; Radakov, 1973). However, individuals might also make 
mistakes (e.g. false alarms) and this can give rise to cascades of false information, 
whereby the whole group is led into a wrong action (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Conradt, 
2011; Giraldeau et al., 2002; Janis, 1982). This raises the question of how sensitive 
should individuals be to information from their conspecifics, a classic dilemma for 
decision makers under uncertainty (Beauchamp and Ruxton, 2007; Giraldeau et al., 2002; 
Lima, 1995b; McNeil et al., 1975; Swets, 1988; Swets et al., 2000; Zweig and Campbell, 
1993). The aim of a decision maker is to take an action whenever a particular condition in 
its environment is fulfilled, but abstain from it when the condition is not fulfilled. In the 
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case of predation risk, for example, an animal should run away in the presence of a 
predator but not in its absence. However, cues indicating a particular condition (e.g. 
presence of a predator) may also appear in its absence. Conversely, the condition may be 
fulfilled without any obvious cues. Increasing responsiveness to such cues leads decision 
makers to increase their chances of correctly taking the action when the condition is 
fulfilled (making a true positive, e.g. run away in the presence of predators) but also that 
of erroneously taking this action in its absence (committing a false positive, e.g. run away 
in the absence of predators) while reducing responsiveness leads to a decrease in false 
positives, but at the cost of reduced true positives. This fundamental trade-off in decision 
accuracy under uncertainty is encountered across many different contexts, including 
predator detection (Beauchamp and Ruxton, 2007; Lima, 1995b) and food detection 
(Giraldeau et al., 2002). 
Recent research has shown that individuals in groups can overcome this 
fundamental trade-off. Using a mathematical model, Wolf et al. (2013) predicted that, 
compared to solitary individuals, individuals in groups can simultaneously increase true 
positives and decrease false positives whenever individuals employ a quorum threshold in 
between the average true and false positive rates of the other group members. This 
prediction was then tested with groups of humans in a simulated predator detection 
experiment in which participants anonymously expressed their intention to either stay or 
escape using voting machines, after which they received a summary chart showing the 
aggregated decisions of all group members and could decide again. The experiment 
revealed that individuals indeed used a quorum threshold in between the average true and 
false positive rates of the other group members, thereby simultaneously increasing true 
positives and decreasing false positives. 
However, in many animal groups an individual does not have access to one 
aggregated response consisting of all the combined independent decisions, but 
information becomes gradually available. An example of this can be found in antipredator 
behaviour, in which often one or a few individuals make a decision (i.e. escape), upon 
which others can decide to either follow this decision or not. Also, in many animal 
groups, individuals can decide to readjust their decision, if they notice that their decision 
is not followed by others. Moreover, in most animal groups movement is the prime cue of 
information transfer. Therefore, we developed an experiment that resembles a more 
realistic scenario which could be relevant to many social animals. We performed a 
predator detection experiment in which individuals moved spatially to indicate their 
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choice, allowing the information to be transmitted much more gradually and dynamically. 
We hypothesized that a group of individuals that can only use movement to indicate 
preferences is able to increase true positives and decrease false positives. Moreover, we 
predicted that groups in which only a few individuals detect a predator individually (i.e. 
low true positive rate) would need a lower fraction of the group indicating escape to cause 
the group to escape compared to groups in which a large number of individuals detected 
the predator individually (i.e. high true positive rate). This was predicted because in 
groups with few individuals detecting a predator, we expected individuals to learn that 
even low numbers of people escaping can correctly indicate the presence of a predator.  
 
Methods 
Experimental set-up 
Students were recruited from the University of Bielefeld (Germany) and Wageningen 
University (The Netherlands). The 310 participants in the tests were distributed over 15 
groups (average group size 20.7, range 17–23). Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants prior to the experiment and data collection was anonymous. 
Each group was confronted with the following predator detection experiment, 
resembling the experiment described in Wolf et al. (2013). All individuals in a group 
were instructed to stand behind a line (4.5 m away from the screen, Fig. 4.1a) and for 2 s 
a slide showing 144 fish (aligned in a 9 x 16 grid) was projected onto a white screen (Fig. 
4.1b). All fish in this school were identical, except one odd fish, which had either six or 
seven spines (Fig. 4.1c). The other 143 fish had no spines. The seven-spined fish 
represented a dangerous predator, whereas the six-spined fish represented a harmless 
individual, akin to a natural situation in which individuals have to discriminate between 
harmful and harmless shapes (see e.g. Beauchamp, 2010; Cresswell et al., 2000). We 
instructed our subjects to adopt the following decision rule: “If you see no odd fish or an 
odd fish with six spines then it is safe and you should stay. If you see an odd fish with 
seven spines then it is dangerous and you should escape”. Participants saw the slide of the 
fish school only once, for 2 s, after which they had 5 s to take an individual decision 
(polling 1) using an electronic keypad (Key Point Interactive Audience Software for 
Power Point, version 2.0.142 Standard Edition), ensuring independent votes of 
participants. Individuals were asked to press 1 if they wanted to escape and they were not 
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allowed to move, gesture or communicate during this stage. Individuals did not receive 
information about the results of polling 1. 
After polling 1, the participants were allowed to make a second decision (polling 
2). Two parallel lines, 1 m apart, had been drawn on the floor (Fig. 4.1a). At the 
beginning of each trial, participants stood behind the line furthest away from the screen. 
Individuals were asked to stay behind the line if they wanted to stay, or to step forward 
(crossing the two lines drawn on the floor) if they wanted to escape (see Fig. 4.1a). 
Participants had 12 s to make a final decision and were allowed to move back and forth as 
often as they wanted during this time. Individuals were not allowed to communicate or 
gesture during polling 2, but they were able to observe and influence each other by taking 
into account the movement of their group members. After 12 s, we counted the 
participants that decided to stay and escape. We also recorded the movement behaviour 
using a video camera (Sony HDR-XR520V, 25 frames/s) mounted on an elevated tripod 
next to the screen facing the volunteers in order to get the widest angle and avoid some of 
the volunteers’ movement being masked by others (Fig. 4.1a). After polling 2, we 
presented the correct answer on the screen and instructed all participants to move back 
behind the original line upon which a new round would start. To motivate participants, we 
had a small reward (chocolate bars) for the participants of the group with the highest 
proportion of correct decisions. This was communicated to the participants before the 
start of the experiment.  
There were two treatments: one fish with six spines and 143 fish without spines or 
one fish with seven spines and 143 fish without spines. Each treatment was replicated 14 
times resulting in a total of 28 rounds per group. The treatment order and the position of 
the odd fish were randomized. Prior to the 28 rounds we performed two test rounds 
during which we instructed the participants about the procedures. The results of the two 
test rounds were not included in our analysis. Both the six- and the seven-spined fish 
came in six different forms (spines arranged differently over the body of the fish) to avoid 
habituation to a specific search image. Each form appeared two to three times throughout 
the 28 rounds. 
 
  
44 
 
 
a) 
 
 
b) 
 
 
c) 
 
 
Figure 4.1: (a) Experimental arena. All participants started behind the first line and 
observed for 2 s (b) a group of 144 fish containing either (c) a six-spined 
(“nondangerous”) or seven-spined (“dangerous”) fish projected on the screen. See 
Methods for details of the procedure. 
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Analysis 
We analysed our data in three steps. First, we studied whether social information 
improved decision accuracy. We compared the average true and false positive rates per 
group for polling 1 and 2 using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test in R version 3.1.1 (R 
Development Core Team, 2015). Note that a true positive is achieved whenever a seven-
spined fish is present and a participant decides to escape; a false positive is committed 
whenever a six-spined fish is present and a participant decides to escape. We also 
evaluated whether individuals became better in correctly detecting the predator 
(individual detection) and/or better in using the social information. For each group we 
calculated general accuracy per round and per polling. General accuracy was calculated 
as the fraction of correct decisions over the total number of decisions and is thus a 
combination of true positives and true negatives. General accuracy was used as the 
response variable in a generalized linear mixed model with group (categorical) as a 
random term; the fixed effects were round number (continuous), polling (categorical: 
individual versus collective), treatment (categorical: predator present or absent) and the 
interaction between round number and polling. In the model we used binomial errors and 
a logit-link function since the response variable followed a distribution between 0 and 1. 
 Second, we studied the dynamics of the decision-making process during polling 2. 
From the recordings, using JWatcher 1.0 (Blumstein et al., 2006), we scored per round 
and per group the time point at which each individual crossed the second line (“escaped”) 
and also whether individuals stepped back again behind the first line (i.e. changed their 
mind from “escaping” to “staying”). From these data, we calculated for each round the 
“decision time”, defined as the time point after which no individual changed its decision. 
We then calculated for each group and each round the slope of the linear regression of the 
cumulative escapes as a function of time, which gives an estimation of the speed of 
escape (expressed in number of people escaping/s). To compute the speed of escaping 
behaviour, we only focused on trials in which at least five people escaped during polling 
2 since trials in which up to four people escaped did not present a real building-up of 
number of escapees over time and a linear regression computed from values of four or 
less would be meaningless. Moreover, the design of the experiment did not allow an 
estimation of the speed of the decision when the decision was staying, as only escaping 
required an active decision and was measurable. Owing to video failure on one of the two 
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experimental locations, this part of the analyses is limited to seven groups (150 
individuals). 
Third, we compared the relationship between the fraction of individuals indicating 
escape in polling 1 and the fraction of individuals escaping at the end of polling 2 
between groups. Although individuals did not receive information about the outcome of 
polling 1, we could still study whether groups differed in how much influence a certain 
mass had in mobilizing the group. We investigated whether the relationship between 
individuals escaping in polling 1 and individuals escaping in polling 2 followed a 
quorum-like pattern (i.e. a sigmoidal curve). A quorum response implies that the 
probability that an individual decides to escape during polling 2 increases in a step-like 
way with the number of other individuals that decided to escape in polling 1. We 
formalized this relationship for each group using the following equation (Conradt, 2012; 
Sumpter and Pratt, 2009): 
 =

 + 
 
where p is the probability that an individual’s final decision during polling 2 is to escape, 
x is the fraction of individuals indicating escape during polling 1, q is the threshold value 
at which the response has the steepest increase and k determines the steepness of this 
increase. As a rule of thumb, a quorum response (corresponding to a strong sigmoidal 
curve) occurs if k  2 and higher values of k imply stronger quorum responses (Conradt, 
2012; Sumpter and Pratt, 2009). In all groups the k value was higher than 2 with an 
average value of 12.7 (median 5.17, range 3.03–109.6). We then estimated the q value for 
each group and compared the q values to the true and false positive rates of polling 1 
using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. 
 
Results 
The true positive percentage was higher in polling 2, where social information was 
available, than in polling 1, where individuals decided independently (mean ± SE: polling 
1: 41.0 ± 8.6, range 23.5–53.6; polling 2: 70.7 ± 11.1, range 51.7–89.6; Z = 3.408, P < 
0.001). All 15 groups had higher true positives in polling 2 than in polling 1 (Fig. 4.2a). 
The false positive percentage was lower in polling 2 than in polling 1 (polling 1: 9.2 ± 
2.6, range 2.7–12.9; polling 2: 4.6 ± 3.6, range 0.7–13.7; Z = -3.237, P < 0.001). Of the 
15 groups, 13 had a lower false positive percentage in polling 2 than in polling 1 (Fig. 
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4.2b). There was no significant effect of round (estimate ± SE = -0.018 ± 0.020; z = -
0.932, P = 0.351) or of the interaction between round and polling (estimate ± SE = -0.009 
± 0.027; z = -0.345, P = 0.730) on general accuracy suggesting that individuals did not 
become gradually better at correctly detecting the presence/absence of a predator (i.e. 
individual detection) or at using the social information. There was an effect of polling 
(estimate ± SE = -1.542 ± 0.470; z = -3.287, P = 0.001) with individuals achieving higher 
accuracy in polling 2 than in polling 1. There was also an effect of treatment (estimate ± 
SE = -4.653 ± 0.472; z = -9.853, P < 0.001): individuals were better at staying when no 
predator was present than at escaping when a predator was present (see also Fig. 4.2a, and 
4.2b).  
 Fig. 4.3 shows the increase in the number of escapees over time per round for the 
seven groups. For clarity, the panels are ranked (within groups) according to the number 
of individuals indicating escape during polling 1. Moving from the left to the right side of 
the figure, we note that with no, or very few, individuals indicating escape in polling 1, 
nobody stepped forward during polling 2. With an increasing number of individuals 
deciding to escape during polling 1, there was some building up of low numbers of 
individuals, but this generally did not lead to much recruitment and occasionally 
participants changed their mind and stepped back again (although this only happened 18 
times over all 196 trials; see for examples panels 7 and 12 of group 4). A further increase 
in the number of people indicating escape in polling 1 resulted in an increase in the 
number of escapees during polling 2, sometimes leading to the recruitment of the entire 
group. Finally, on the right side of the figure, a large number of people indicating escape 
during polling 1 resulted in the entire group moving forward very fast.  
We then studied how the fraction of individuals indicating escape in polling 1 
affected (1) the fraction of individuals escaping in polling 2, (2) the “decision time” and 
(3) the number of people escaping/s (only including trials in which at least five people 
escaped, N = 81 trials). The relationship between the fraction of individuals escaping 
during polling 1 and the fraction of individuals escaping at the end of polling 2 followed a 
sigmoidal pattern (Fig. 4.4a, 4.5a). When looking at the decision time in more detail (Fig. 
4.4a), we note that a very low (< 0.1) and a high (> 0.5) fraction of individuals indicating 
escape in polling 1 gave rise to rapid decisions (purple shading), whereas a moderate 
fraction of individuals indicating escape in polling 1 (0.2–0.5) led to long decision times 
(blue shading). The increase in the number of escapees over time within each round (i.e. 
Fig. 4.3) generally followed a linear pattern (average R2 linear regression: 0.95 ± 0.08, 
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range 0.54–1.00). Note that the linear fit was not perfect in all cases, and some cases 
could be better described with more complex functions. For simplicity, we restricted our 
analysis to linear relationships which captured most of the dynamics fairly well. We 
calculated the slope of this relationship per round per group (only including trials in 
which five or more participants escaped). The slope depended on the fraction of 
individuals deciding to escape during polling 1: the higher this fraction the steeper the 
slope (estimate ± SE = 7.68 ± 0.74; t = 10.41, P < 0.001; Fig. 4.4b).  
Finally, we looked at differences between groups. We compared the relationship 
between the fraction of individuals escaping during polling 1 and 2 between groups (Fig. 
4.5a). There was a positive correlation between the average true positive rate of the group 
during polling 1 and the q value (threshold value at which the response has the steepest 
increase; rS = 0.559, P = 0.030; Fig. 4.5b), suggesting that individuals adjusted their 
sensitivity adaptively to the performance of the group. There was no correlation between 
the average false positive rate of the group during polling 1 and the q value (rS = 0.446, P 
= 0.095), probably because of the lower between-group variation in false positives than 
true positives during polling 1. 
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Discussion 
Our results show that individuals in groups can simultaneously increase true positives and 
decrease false positives. This result is similar to the findings of Wolf et al. (2013) but here 
we show that this can arise by using a simple and generic movement rule and a gradual 
building up of information. This is a more realistic scenario for most animal groups. 
Information transmission via movement alone is a very common mechanism in 
gregarious animals observed in deer and primates (Conradt and Roper, 2003; Sueur et al., 
2010), as well as bird flocks (Beauchamp and Ruxton, 2007; Cresswell, 1994; Lima, 
1994), fish schools (Herbert-Read et al., 2011; Radakov, 1973; Ward et al., 2011) and 
even human pedestrians (Faria et al., 2010a). Using a movement scenario thus allowed 
individuals to express their opinions to others via a simple and generic decision 
mechanism. 
When looking in detail at the decision-making process, we see that individuals 
rarely stepped forward alone. When there were few individuals indicating escape during 
polling 1, they generally did not step forward by themselves. Individuals thus did seem to 
be socially inhibited about disclosing their personal information which highlights the 
important distinction between the opinion of an individual and its actions in a social 
context (Weber, 1978). Most likely, individuals were monitoring whether others were 
willing to step forward and only moved forward if enough others were willing to join this 
decision. At the other extreme, if half, or more, of the group members indicated escape 
during polling 1, then the decision-making process during polling 2 became very 
predictable and all participants stepped forward quickly. In between, the process was less 
predictable, and here other important factors might have played a role such as self-
confidence of individuals and/or certainty of information, making the decision process 
longer. Interestingly, the number of escapees over time during the collective decision-
making process generally followed a linear pattern (i.e. Fig. 4.3). However, if we only 
take into account the results of polling 1 (individual decision) and of polling 2 (the 
collective decision), we see that a linear building up can still lead to a quorum response 
(see Fig. 4.5a). Without the personal information of the individuals we would have thus 
concluded that there is no quorum response, but quorum responses do apparently play a 
role. It is important to note that here we focused on individuals crossing the second line as 
a potential cue for others, but that individuals might use a variety of movement cues as 
social information. Individuals might, for example, use stepping forward by others as a 
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cue, the speed of stepping forward and/or a combination of different cues. Although 
beyond the scope of this study, it would be an interesting avenue for further research to 
look in more detail at which (combination of) movement cues are used. 
It is well known that groups of decision makers employing a majority vote can 
outperform solitary decision makers whenever the individual probability of making a 
correct decision is higher than 50%. This is known as the Condorcet theorem (Boland, 
1989; List, 2004). A corollary of this theorem is that, if the individual probability of 
making a correct decision is lower than 50%, increasing the number of decision makers 
will decrease the accuracy of the group decision. Interestingly, the average true positive 
rate of individual decisions in our experiment was maximally 53.6% and could be as low 
as 23.5% (see Fig. 4.2a). Nevertheless, in all collective decisions true positive rates went 
up dramatically (see Fig. 4.2a) showing that our participants did not merely follow a 
simple majority rule. This also became apparent when calculating the q values. These 
values were all well below 50% (range 15–34.8%) indicating that minorities were 
frequently followed. Our results also strongly suggest that individuals adjusted their 
thresholds to the average individual true positive rate of the group they were in. In groups 
with a very low average individual true positive rate, relatively few individuals indicating 
escape in polling 1 were required to mobilize group members to escape in polling 2. In 
contrast, in groups with a high average individual true positive rate, many individuals 
indicating escape in polling 1 were required to mobilize the others (Fig. 4.5). The result 
that small informed minorities were able to mobilize a large part of the group also 
confirms previous models (Couzin et al., 2005) and studies (Dyer et al., 2008, 2009; Faria 
et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2013) that showed that a small minority of informed leaders is 
able to lead a whole group in the right direction. 
By enabling dynamic interactions between participants, our experimental set-up 
allowed for more realistic mechanisms of information exchange between the individuals 
involved in collective decision-making than in previous work. It also gave group 
members the opportunity to be influenced by highly dominant individuals or top 
performers (possessing private information of higher quality due to, for example, better 
eyesight; King, Cheng, Starke, & Myatt, 2011; King, Johnson, & Van Vugt, 2009). An 
interesting issue for further study would be to identify the precise mechanism allowing 
group coordination. Are there local effects, whereby neighbours of fast-moving 
individuals get dragged along, or are there only global effects? Is it a pure voting 
procedure as discussed in Wolf et al. (2013)? Is speed related to accuracy? Indeed, several 
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mechanisms could produce the result we observed. For example, especially in a predator 
avoidance context, individuals might differ in the timing of their decisions depending on 
their information status (Hilton et al., 1999; King and Cowlishaw, 2009). Also, 
confidence levels of individuals may vary across the different rounds, leading to different 
individuals alternating in taking the lead from one round to the other. In addition, all 
members had the same interest in escaping when there was a predator, and timing did not 
affect the payoff. As suggested in Kurvers et al. (2014a), an interesting investigation 
would be to include competition by granting higher rewards to the faster correct decision 
makers compared to the slower ones, as an early escape is clearly beneficial in the wild 
(Bednekoff and Lima, 1998). Finally, how do the dynamics of the decision-making 
process depend on group size and on the costs of specific errors (e.g. for animals in the 
wild, the costs of a false negative are usually higher than the costs of a false positive). 
Next to future experiments in the human domain, we also envisage researchers 
studying the combination of true and false positives in nonhuman animal groups. As yet, 
these studies are largely absent. In the collective predator detection literature, for 
example, most studies have investigated either true positives (Lazarus, 1979; van Schaik 
et al., 1983; Sirot, 2006; Treherne and Foster, 1981; Ward et al., 2008, 2011) or false 
positives (Beauchamp, 2010; Beauchamp and Ruxton, 2007) but rarely the combination 
of true and false positives (Proctor et al., 2001; Roberts, 1997). Therefore it is currently 
unclear whether this decision mechanism (i.e. increasing true positives while decreasing 
false positives) is also operating in nonhuman animals. Given the inherent trade-off 
between true and false positives, studying one aspect will only provide part of the picture 
and to understand the complete costs and benefits of collective predator detection it is 
important to study both aspects simultaneously. Technological advancements such as 
accelerometers combined with GPS (Eagle and Pentland, 2006) that can capture the 
movement behaviour of multiple individuals simultaneously and can provide detailed 
information on how individuals react to decisions and movements of groupmates can 
prove useful in exploring these issues. An important difference to point out for many 
animal groups under predation is the potential benefit of staying together even in 
situations in which the group makes wrong decisions. Even when a predator attacks, it is 
usually more beneficial to stay in the group rather than leave it with the intention of 
escaping from the predator (Krause and Ruxton, 2002). This is an issue that we have not 
included in our experimental setting but is most likely to be an important mechanism in 
animal groups under predation. 
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Finally, we found that individuals were better at correctly staying than at correctly 
escaping. This could be because individuals had to make an active decision to escape 
(press a button in polling 1 and move forward in polling 2) but no active decision was 
required to stay. We decided to use this set-up because we wanted to create a situation 
comparable to animal groups in which the default behaviour is to stay (and continue 
foraging) but an active decision is required to escape. 
 Our study shows that information transmission via movement behaviour allows 
individuals in groups to simultaneously increase true positives and decrease false 
positives, thereby escaping an important trade-off in decision-making. Since information 
transmission via movement is widespread in animal decision-making, this mechanism 
could be relevant for a wide range of animal groups to improve decision accuracy. Our 
study also shows that there can be a discrepancy between the opinion of a person and his 
or her actions, which calls for more research in the human domain about the link between 
both. It is also a call for researchers studying animal decision-making to extract more 
information about the internal state of an individual and not only observe the decision 
outcome. 
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Abstract 
Group-living is widespread among animals and one of the major advantages of group-
living is the ability of groups to solve cognitive problems that exceed individual ability. 
Humans also make use of collective cognition and have simultaneously developed a 
highly complex language to exchange information. Here we investigated collective 
cognition of human groups regarding language use in a realistic situation. Individuals 
listened to a public announcement and had to reconstruct the sentence alone or in groups. 
This situation is often encountered by humans, for instance at train stations or airports. 
Using recent developments in machine speech recognition, we analysed how well 
individuals and groups reconstructed the sentences from a syntactic (i.e., the number of 
errors) and semantic (i.e., the quality of the retrieved information) perspective. We show 
that groups perform better both on a syntactic and semantic level than even their best 
members. Groups made fewer errors and were able to retrieve more information when 
reconstructing the sentences, outcompeting even their best group members. Our study 
takes collective cognition studies to the more complex level of language use in humans. 
 
Plos One 8: e77943, 2013 
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Introduction 
Group-living is widespread among animals and one of the major advantages of group-
living is the ability of groups to solve cognitive problems that exceed individual ability 
(Bonabeau et al., 1999; Conradt and List, 2009; Couzin, 2009; Krause and Ruxton, 2002; 
Krause et al., 2010; Wolf et al., 2013). This process is known as the many wrongs 
principle (Simons, 2004), swarm intelligence (Bonabeau et al., 1999; Krause et al., 2010), 
wisdom of crowds (Surowiecki, 2004) or collective cognition (CC) (Couzin, 2009). Fish, 
for example, make faster and more accurate decisions in groups than when alone (Ward et 
al., 2011), in ants larger colonies are faster at finding the best nesting sites (Franks et al., 
2006) and in birds larger groups are more successful in innovative problem solving (Liker 
and Bókony, 2009). Also humans can make use of CC and CC has been shown to solve a 
number of different problems including predicting the results of elections (Arrow et al., 
2008; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004) solving letters-to-numbers problems (Laughlin et al., 
2003, 2006) and increasing speed and accuracy at reaching a target when navigating as a 
group (Faria et al., 2009).  
 A remarkable feature of humans is the use of a highly complex language. 
Language is thought to have played a critical role in the evolution of hominids (Noble and 
Davidson, 1996) giving them a unique way of sharing information among conspecifics. 
Moreover, group discussion is still the most widely used method by human groups to 
arrive at consensus decisions. Several studies have investigated CC of human groups with 
regards to quantity estimations and letters-to number problems (see Krause et al. (2010) 
for a review). However, few studies made language itself the focus of their investigation. 
Here we simulated a realistic scenario to investigate the potential of CC in human verbal 
communication: individuals listened to a public announcement and had to reconstruct the 
announcement alone or in groups. This situation is frequently encountered by humans in 
their daily life, for instance at train stations or airports. 
Communication analysis is challenging but recent developments of sophisticated 
methods in machine speech recognition have provided us with powerful tools that allow 
the analysis of syntax and semantics of human language (Jurafsky and Martin, 2009). 
Here we apply these novel tools to study if human groups can decrease error rate (syntax) 
and increase semantic understanding compared to single individuals in an everyday task. 
In this study we particularly focused on the question whether groups can outperform their 
best member. 
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Material and methods 
Experimental setup 
We recruited 167 student volunteers from the University of Bielefeld (Germany) 
participating in a course on behavioural ecology (April 2011). Participants were divided 
in 21 groups. All groups consisted of eight members, except one group which had 7 
members. Informed consent was obtained from all participants and data collection was 
anonymous. Prior to the experiment we communicated to all participants that they were 
allowed to leave at any time. All procedures were carried out in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki. We deemed it unnecessary to apply for formal ethical approval 
for this study as it is highly unlikely that participants would feel uncomfortable in 
participating in this simple and straightforward task. Listening to a sentence and 
reconstructing a sentence is a very simple task that most people perform on a daily basis 
without any negative consequences. Moreover, the experiment was part of a student 
practical for which no ethical approval was required and the students used the data 
afterwards for learning about experimental design. 
In the experiment, two sentences in German and of equal length were played back 
to the participants (See Table 5.1). These were announcements that are typically audible 
at a train station or an airport. We added echo, white noise and a 55 Hz tone to both 
sentences using Audacity (http://audacity.sourceforge.net) mimicking a real-life situation 
at a public place as for instance encountered at a train station or an airport. 
All groups underwent two treatments: “individual treatment” and “group 
treatment”. In both treatments, participants listened first to a sentence and were given 1 
minute to individually write down the sentence as they heard it. Then, for the individual 
treatment, participants were permitted four additional minutes to improve their sentences 
individually. In the group treatment, the participants had four minutes to discuss and write 
down one consensual sentence. All groups received each sentence once (i.e., one sentence 
during the individual treatment and the other during the group treatment). The order of 
the two treatments (i.e., individual or group) and the two sentences were randomized so 
that each of the 4 combinations was performed with approximately the same number of 
groups (5 or 6). 
The participants wrote their sentences on sheets that had 30 boxes and were asked 
to write one word per box and to leave blanks where they thought that a word was 
missing. The number of boxes far exceeded the actual number of words in the sentences 
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to avoid limiting the participants or giving them a clue regarding the actual number of 
words. 
 
Analysis 
The quality of the reconstructed sentences was evaluated on two levels: syntactic, i.e. 
regarding the correctness of the word sequences, and semantic, i.e. regarding the 
correctness of the pieces of information contained in the sentences.  
For the syntactic analysis we used the “Word Error Rate” (WER), which is the 
standard evaluation metric for speech recognition (Jurafsky and Martin, 2009). The WER 
is the minimum number of changes (insertions, deletions, and substitutions of words) 
needed to transform the correct sentence into the reconstructed one, divided by the 
number of words in the correct sentence (see Table 5.2 for an example). The WER was 
calculated using the Speech Recognition Scoring Toolkit (version 2.3.5) of the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/tools.cfm). 
The meaning of a sentence with a low WER is not necessarily more correct than 
that of a sentence with a high WER because the WER does not take the semantic 
relevance of words into account. Therefore, in our semantic analysis we looked at 
particular pieces of information, called “items” that constituted the meaning of the 
sentences. We identified 8 items for the train station announcement and 7 items for the 
airport announcement (See Table 5.1). We evaluated the semantic correctness using the 
following measures that are widely used in the fields of information retrieval and speech 
recognition (Jurafsky and Martin, 2009). 
 
Precision (P) = Number of correct items in the reconstructed sentence / Total number of 
items in the reconstructed sentence 
 
Recall (R) = Number of correct items in the reconstructed sentence / Total number of 
items in the correct sentence 
 
The precision measures the degree to which the retrieved information is correct. The 
recall measures how much of the available information was successfully retrieved. To 
evaluate the overall quality of information retrieval, it is common to combine them by 
computing their harmonic mean, called the F-measure (Jurafsky and Martin, 2009): 
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F = 2PR / (P+R) 
 
The F-measure was calculated using an own script. 
 
Decision mechanism 
To understand how groups arrived at communal decisions we studied the transition from 
the collection of independent responses to the group response during the “group 
treatment”. For this we listed all eight independent responses per word per group and 
compared this to the group decision of that particular word and that particular group. We 
distinguished between the categories: consensus (i.e., all independent responses that were 
given were identical to the group response), majority (i.e., the group response 
corresponded to the word that was most often reconstructed during the independent 
responses), tie (i.e., the group response corresponded to one of two (or more) words that 
were most often reconstructed during the independent responses), minority (i.e., the group 
response was present in the independent responses but was not one of the words that were 
most often given in the independent responses) and invented (i.e., the group response was 
not present in the independent responses). We studied how frequently these different 
situations occurred and whether they led to better decisions. For this we calculated the 
rate of correct responses for the independent responses (varying between 0 and 1) and 
compared this to the group decision (either 0 or 1) (hereafter called: “success rate”). 
Whenever individuals had no answer for a particular word (i.e., did not hear it) we treated 
this as “incorrect”.  
 We also studied the group performance as compared to the combination of the 
best responses from all independent responses (i.e., combining the best answers of all 
given independent opinions). This allowed us to study if there was a so-called assembly 
bonus effect present which means that group performance is better than the performance 
of all individual group members or any combination of individual member efforts 
(Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; Tindale and Larson, 1992). 
 
Statistics 
For the individual treatment, we calculated the WER and F-measure of all individuals and 
of the best individual after one minute and after four additional minutes. For the group 
treatment, we calculated the WER and F-measure of the best individual after 1 minute 
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and the group performance (i.e., after four minutes of discussion). A direct comparison 
between the best individual after four additional minutes in the individual treatment and 
the group consensus after four minutes in the group treatment was not possible since we 
found strong effects of both treatment order and sentence (see below) preventing a direct 
comparison. Therefore, we ran a separate analysis within each treatment (i.e., individual 
and group) to quantify the effect of additional minutes on individual and group 
performance. The success of reconstructing the two sentences (measured by WER and F-
measure) by (1) all members, (2) best members and (3) groups were analysed using 
(separate) generalized linear mixed models with a logit link function (glmmPQL function 
in package MASS in R, version 2.14.1). As fixed effects in all models we included time 
(i.e., 1 or 4 minutes) sentence and treatment order (i.e., first or second experiment). For 
the model including all members, we included individual nested in group as a random 
effect. For the models including best members or groups, we included group as random 
effect.  
 
Results 
Individual treatment 
In the individual treatment, there was no difference in WER or F-measure after 1 or 4 
minutes including all individuals (Fig. 5.1a; Table 5.3). There was an effect of treatment 
order on WER and F-measure during the individual treatment (Table 5.3). Participants 
that started with the individual treatment performed worse during the individual treatment 
(i.e., higher WER and lower F-measure) than those that finished with the individual 
treatment. Additionally, there was an effect of sentence on F-measure but not on WER 
(Table 5.3). Likewise, the best individuals of the group did not improve in WER or F-
measure with additional time (WER: 1 minute: (mean ± SD=) 0.41 ± 0.09, 4 minutes: 
0.37 ± 0.10, P = 0.23; F-measure: 1 minute: 0.68 ± 0.09; 4 minutes: 0.67 ± 0.09, P = 
0.45; Fig. 5.1b). 
 
Group treatment 
Groups scored significantly better on both the WER and the F-measure than the best 
performing individual in the group treatment (WER: 1 minute: (mean ± SD=) 0.37 ± 0.09, 
4 minutes: 0.29 ± 0.09; F-measure: 1 minute: 0.69 ± 0.09; 4 minutes: 0.75 ± 0.13; Table 
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5.4, Fig. 5.1c). There was no effect of treatment order or sentence on WER or F-measure 
during the group treatment (Table 5.4). 
 
Decision mechanism 
Most of the group decisions when choosing individual words were based on consensus (n 
= 178) or majority (n = 129), followed by ties (n = 51) and minority (n = 11). A few 
words (n = 6) were not present in the individual responses but were invented (Fig. 5.2). 
The success rate of groups was higher than individual success rate in all categories, 
except during minority voting (Fig. 5.2, see also Discussion). 
 The combination of best individual responses was significantly better than the 
group response (WER: 0.16 ± 0.08, P < 0.01; F-measure: 0.86 ± 0.09, P < 0.01). 
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Figure 5.1: Groups outperformed their best members. During the “individual 
treatment”, (a) individuals did not improve their WER or F-measure with extra time. (b) 
Likewise, the best individuals of each group did not improve with extra time. During the 
“group treatment”, (c) groups had a lower WER and a higher F-measure than the best 
individuals. Shown are mean ± SE of WER (closed circles) and F-measure (open circles). 
Data are based on all sentences.  
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Figure 5.2: Mechanisms of group decisions. Shown are the different categories of how 
groups decided on a word based on the collection of independent responses/words. 
Consensus: all independent responses were identical to the group response; majority: the 
group response corresponded to the word that was most often reconstructed during the 
independent responses; tie: the group response corresponded to one of two (or more) 
words that were most often reconstructed during the independent responses; minority: the 
group response was present in the independent responses but was not one of the words 
that were most often given in the independent responses; invented: the group response 
was not present in the independent responses. Per category, the frequency (labelled as 
“N”) and the success rate (mean ± SE) of individuals (white bars) and groups (dark bars) 
are shown. Whenever an individual did not fill in a word as an independent response this 
was considered as “incorrect”. Majority decisions resulted in higher success rate and were 
much more frequent than minority decisions, which did not improve success rate.  
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Table 5.1. Overview of the sentences as used in this study. The original German 
sentences, the English translation of the sentences and the semantic “items” of both 
sentences. 
 
Train station announcement Airport announcement 
Original sentence: 
Der Zug aus Reinfeld mit Weiterfahrt nach 
Hamburg-Dammtor, Abfahrt um 15 Uhr 
32, fährt heute auf Gleis 19 ein. 
Original sentence: 
Die Fluggäste des Fluges LG 327 nach 
Stettin werden gebeten, sich umgehend 
zum Flugsteig C 31 zu begeben. 
Translated sentence:  
The train from Reinfeld continuing to 
Hamburg-Dammtor, leaving at 15:32 
arrives today on platform 19. 
Translated sentence:  
The passengers of flight LG 327 to Stettin 
are requested to go to gate C 31 
immediately. 
 
List of 8 semantic items: 
- the subject (train) 
- the origin of the train (from Reinfeld) 
- the destination of the train (to Hamburg 
Dammtor) 
- the fact that the announcement is about a 
departure 
- the time of departure (15:32) 
- the action of the train (arrives) 
- the date (today) 
- the platform (platform 19) 
List of 7 semantic items: 
- the addressees (passengers) 
- the airline code (LG) 
- the flight number (327) 
- the destination of the flight (to Stettin) 
- where to go (gate) 
- the gate number (C 31) 
- the requested action (go to) 
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Table 5.2. Example for the computation of the Word Error Rate (WER). The first 
sentence is the correct one, the second sentence is the reconstructed one. The insertions, 
deletions, and substitutions are marked by ‘I’, ‘D’, and ‘S’, respectively. For this example 
the WER = (number of changes) / (number of words in the correct sentence) = 4/13.  
 
The train to London 
 
is delayed for fifteen minutes due to bad weather 
The train to London Euston is delayed for fifty minutes due to   
    
I 
   
S 
   
D D 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3. Result of the generalized linear mixed model analysis of the “individual 
treatment” including all individuals. Shown are the effects of time (i.e., performance after 
1 minute or after 4 additional minutes), order (i.e., sentence being played first or second) 
and sentence (i.e., train station or airport announcement) on (a) the Word Error Rate and 
(b) the F-measure.  
 
(a) Word error rate (WER) 
 estimate Std. Error t P 
(Intercept) 0.858 0.113 7.597 < 0.001 
Time -0.100 0.066 -1.514 0.131 
Order -0.627 0.121 -5.167 < 0.001 
Sentence -0.254 0.121 -2.091 0.051 
(b) F-measure 
 estimate Std. Error t P 
(Intercept) -0.737 0.120 -6.125 < 0.001 
Time 0.070 0.076 0.918 0.359 
Order 0.622 0.128 4.850 < 0.001 
Sentence 0.626 0.128 4.874 < 0.001 
68 
 
Table 5.4. Results of the generalized linear mixed model analysis of the “group 
treatment”. Shown are the effects of time (i.e., performance of the best individual after 1 
minute or the group decision after 4 additional minutes), order (i.e., sentence being played 
first or last) and sentence (i.e., train station or airport announcement) on (a) the Word 
Error Rate and (b) the F-measure. 
 
(a) Word error rate (WER) 
 estimate Std. Error t P 
(Intercept) -0.754 0.145 -5.218 < 0.001 
Time -0.372 0.101 -3.670 0.002 
Order 0.174 0.153 1.133 0.272 
Sentence 0.254 0.154 1.655 0.115 
(b) F-measure 
 estimate Std. Error t P 
(Intercept) 1.087 0.201 5.399 < 0.001 
Time 0.288 0.126 2.282 0.034 
Order -0.133 0.217 -0.614 0.547 
Sentence -0.341 0.217 -1.571 0.134 
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Discussion 
We show that groups were able to decrease the number of errors and increase the 
semantic value of reconstructed sentences in a realistic context. In the individual 
treatment, extra time did not improve the performance, whereas in the group treatment the 
group outcome was better than the single best individual (Katsikopoulos and King, 2010; 
Kerr and Tindale, 2004). 
Groups performed better than their best individual both at the syntactic level 
(WER) and at the semantic level (F-measure). The developments in machine speech 
recognition and collective cognition have so far been separate fields of research. We 
believe that tools developed in machine speech recognition can open up new possibilities 
to study how language is used and processed by human groups. This can increase our 
understanding of how and why human groups use language. This is an important 
consideration, since language is thought to have played a critical role in the evolution of 
hominids (Noble and Davidson, 1996) giving them a unique way of sharing information. 
Due to our limited number of groups (21) and sentences (2) further studies are, however, 
necessary to evaluate the robustness of our findings. An important consideration is how 
group improvement is affected by the complexity of the sentence in terms of syntax and 
semantics. Does group improvement occur only at a narrow range of complexity, or at a 
broad spectrum of complexity levels? Also further research is warranted to understand 
how group improvement in sentence reconstruction tasks scales with group size (see also 
Sorkin, Hays, & West, 2001). 
In many previous studies on CC in humans, information is aggregated 
computationally by the experimenter, post-hoc (King et al., 2011a; Krause et al., 2011; 
Lorenz et al., 2011; but see King et al., 2011b). Here we obtained independent 
information from the study subjects, who were then allowed to communicate. The 
aggregation was thus done by the subjects, simulating real group decision-making in 
humans. This communication is a key ingredient for CC to arise. It allows participants to 
exchange not only their opinions but also their level of confidence, a critical piece of 
information (Bahrami et al., 2010) enabling others to judge how relevant the separate 
pieces of information are. This allows groups to make better decisions than individuals 
even in the absence of feedback on individual performances (Bahrami et al., 2010). It 
would be interesting to see how well groups would do in the absence of communication 
and only show individuals the opinions of their group members. This would allow 
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quantification of the importance of the communication aspect. For simple tasks such as 
estimating quantities, and provided that estimations are independent and then aggregated, 
group size is one of the main predictors of decision accuracy (Krause et al., 2011b). 
However, for more complex tasks (such as sentence reconstructions) a benefit of CC with 
increasing group size is not always a given since larger groups might face communication 
difficulties. Moreover, CC is not suitable for all types of problems and in some cases it is 
better to follow the expert (Katsikopoulos and King, 2010; Krause et al., 2011b). Group 
discussions can even impair decision accuracy due to the inequality of individual 
influence (Sunstein, 2005) because the opinion of others can negatively influence 
individual decisions (Lorenz et al., 2011). 
Majority decisions occurred much more often than minority decisions (Fig. 5.2) 
suggesting that there were no strong leaders or dominant individuals present that managed 
to override majorities (King et al., 2009). During the group discussions, there was often a 
substantial proportion of individuals (on average 42.3%) that did not fill in a word which 
might have facilitated majority decisions since the presence of uninformed individuals 
can increase democratic, majority decisions (Couzin et al., 2011). Majority decisions led 
to much better decisions, as opposed to minority decisions which deteriorated decisions, 
illustrating that majority decision is a successful strategy in sentence reconstruction tasks. 
Most other types of decisions also led to better decisions (Fig. 5.2) and in a few cases 
groups managed to find the correct word whereas it was not present in their individual 
responses. This, however, occurred only rarely and we did not find evidence in favour of 
the assembly bonus effect, which means that group performance is better than the 
performance of any individual group member or any combination of individual member 
efforts (Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; Tindale and Larson, 1992). In contrast, the best 
possible combination of individual responses was significantly better than the group 
response indicating that although correct words were available, the groups were not 
always able to incorporate them into their final answer. 
Ultimately, the critical test of collective cognition is the actual decision that 
groups and individuals would make (i.e., would they have caught the train or plane?). We 
did not study decision accuracy directly but extracted meaning from reconstructed 
sentences. Evaluating the pragmatic level is a difficult theoretical problem to solve 
(Jurafsky and Martin, 2009). One possibility is to ask people to carry out the task. 
However, if it is an everyday problem, people might not only use collective cognition but 
start using other strategies as well, such as looking at a map or asking professionals. And 
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if on the other hand the problem is too limited and artificial, then the result would not be 
representative. 
From an evolutionary point of view, the fact that groups beat even their best 
members shows that not only the average individuals, but also the top ones have an 
incentive to join a group to solve complex problems. Assessing the costs and benefits (to 
arrive at fitness measures) of such strategies (i.e. solving a problem alone or as part of a 
group) remains an important challenge for future studies. 
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Collective cognition is widespread in the animal kingdom and certain properties of 
collective cognition have even been described in plants (Baluska et al., 2010) and cancer 
cells (Deisboeck and Couzin, 2009). This thesis investigated several aspects of collective 
cognition encountered in fish and in humans. I will now sum up the results described in 
the previous chapters and discuss them in a broader context. 
In this thesis, I showed that for problems as diverse as estimating a quantity 
(chapter 2), distinguishing between edible and non-edible items (chapter 3), deciding to 
escape or stay depending on a perceived threat (chapter 4), and deciphering a noisy 
message (chapter 5), decisions improve with group size, confirming previous studies on 
various species (Laughlin et al., 2003; Liker and Bókony, 2009; Ward et al., 2008, 2011). 
I showed this improvement for groups of humans (chapters 2, 4, 5) by comparing groups 
to individuals, and for guppies in various group sizes (chapter 3). This improvement can 
result from different types of interactions: pure aggregation (chapter 2), visual 
observation (chapters 3 and 4), or discussion (chapter 5). Some of these interactions such 
as visual observation and reaction to other individuals’ movement were observed in 
guppies (chapter 3) as well as in humans (chapter 4), and have been reported in various 
species (Conradt and Roper, 2003; Cresswell, 1994; Lima, 1994). Certain mechanisms 
leading to collective decisions such as quorum responses have been observed in humans 
(chapter 4) and in animals such as social insects (Seeley and Visscher, 2004; Sumpter and 
Pratt, 2009), primates (Sueur et al., 2010), and fish (Ward et al., 2008). This suggests that 
the processes underlying collective decisions via movement are remarkably similar 
between humans and animals. 
Furthermore, in the chapters 2 and 5, I showed that, in addition to improving 
decision compared to average individuals, groups are able to beat their best members in 
different contexts. I showed that groups can outperform their best member if a given 
problem occurs repeatedly (chapter 2), or if the task is very complex (chapter 5). In the 
wild, these cognitive problems are analogous to detecting a frequent predator that is 
slightly cryptic, or a rarer but extremely cryptic predator. In both cases, the stakes can be 
high enough for even the best members to benefit from joining a group. 
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Studying collective cognition in the wild versus in simulation 
experiments 
Throughout this thesis, I have looked at collective cognition from both ends of the 
spectrum: from wild conditions in free-ranging guppies (chapter 3) to very controlled 
simulation experiments in humans (chapters 2, 4, and 5). 
When studying collective behaviour, groups are the unit of replication. The high 
number of individuals needed therefore adds to the inherent difficulties of field 
experiments. This explains why the number of studies that have investigated collective 
cognition in the wild is limited (Ballerini et al., 2008; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Kenward, 
1978; Treherne and Foster, 1981) and most studies on collective decision-making have 
been done in captivity (Amé et al., 2006; Franks et al., 2006; Herbert-Read et al., 2011; 
Ward et al., 2011) or on humans (Dyer et al., 2008; Faria et al., 2009; King et al., 2011b; 
Kurvers et al., 2014a; Wolf et al., 2013). Although this allows studying the function and 
mechanisms of collective cognition in very controlled conditions, those conditions may 
also be oversimplified or even unnatural and omit important factors. Animals live in a 
complex environment and are subject to many influences such as inter- and intraspecific 
competition, predation, weather fluctuations, etc. Some of these factors may directly 
influence collective cognition. Studies in natural conditions are thus necessary to verify 
that the effects predicted by models and observed in laboratory studies are still robust in 
the wild. 
In chapter 3, I studied the ability of wild guppies to make better decisions as a 
function of group size. This investigation followed a comparative approach and took 
place at locations that are subject to different levels of predation. Previous studies have 
shown that predation can affect social structure and behaviour (Kelley et al., 2011) but 
few studies have investigated collective cognition in animals across populations that are 
subject to different predation pressures in the wild (but see Webster & Laland, 2008 for a 
laboratory experiment). I showed that guppies indeed made better decisions with 
increasing group size, most likely as a result of social information use. Although guppies 
were less active in high predation sites, guppies’ decision quality did not differ between 
high and low predation sites. It would be interesting for future studies to look into the 
dynamics of how information is transmitted. 
In the chapters 2, 4, and 5, I investigated collective cognition in human groups, 
exposing them to tasks that increased in complexity and testing different rules for 
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combining information, ranging from aggregation of independent decisions, to group 
discussions. Working with humans facilitated the separation between private and social 
information. 
Through the use of questionnaires (chapters 2 and 5) and voting machines (chapter 
4), it was possible to identify each individual’s private information before it got shared 
with other group members. Furthermore, it was possible to manipulate the level of 
interaction between the participants: i) no interaction (chapter 2) where private estimates 
were aggregated; ii) movement behaviour without verbal communication, mimicking 
situations occurring in wild animals (chapter 4); iii) open discussion (chapter 5), which is 
a typical process for groups of humans to reach a decision. 
In chapter 2, participants were asked to estimate a quantity several times. The 
average of their guesses was then used as a proxy to estimate the potential of collective 
cognition. I found that in this context of a repeated task, some individuals were able to 
beat the group several times, but not every time. In this experiment, the best individual 
could beat the group 7 times out of 10. This showed that even for simple tasks, top 
performers can benefit from being in a group if these tasks are encountered repeatedly. 
Using an aggregation rule may not seem very realistic when comparing to animal groups 
in the wild, but this allowed me to look into the potential for collective cognition without 
having to worry about the potential weaknesses of interactions. 
In chapter 4, participants were asked to escape or stay depending on the presence 
or absence of a simulated predator. They were only allowed to move forward or backward 
but not to verbally communicate. Despite its apparent simplicity, this setup has a lot in 
common with many wild animal groups since in many situations the main form of 
communication for this type of decision is through making escape movements that can 
indicate the presence of a predator (Beauchamp and Ruxton, 2007; Conradt and Roper, 
2003; Sueur et al., 2010; Ward et al., 2011). Even in humans, observing the movement 
behaviour of others can elicit a movement response (Faria et al., 2010a). I found that 
individuals in a group were able to improve their decision using social information. 
Compared to individuals alone, individuals in groups were able to increase their true 
positive rates and decrease their false positive rates simultaneously, using only the 
information provided by the movement of others. This improvement arose in the absence 
of any verbal communication. Seeing a given number of individuals in the group escaping 
was sufficient to trigger an escape by most of the other group members. Individuals used 
specific threshold rules, also known as quorum rules, which allowed them to make the 
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correct decision most of the time, following the decision of a fraction of the group that 
was much smaller than the majority, indicating that the group can benefit from following 
a minority (Conradt and Roper, 2003; Couzin et al., 2005; Dyer et al., 2008). 
In chapter 5, I included verbal discussion as a means for the group to improve 
decision accuracy. In this experiment, participants had to listen to a distorted audio 
announcement and, after writing down what they understood from the announcement, 
they had to discuss with their group members on how to reconstruct the original 
announcement. I found that groups’ results were not only better than those of average 
individuals but also better than their best members. This showed that when a problem is 
complex enough, best members can benefit from joining a group. However, high 
performing individuals still had an influence on the group performance. This problem 
simulated a situation that humans encounter regularly in everyday life. 
 
Collective cognition to solve increasingly complex tasks 
In chapter 2, I studied whether groups are able to outperform not only average 
individuals, but also the best individuals in the group. Using a simple estimation task, I 
showed that when the task is repeated often enough, even the best individuals don’t 
manage to beat the group. This confirms theoretical predictions that experts are likely to 
beat groups in single-shot decisions but that groups perform better for repeated tasks 
(Katsikopoulos and King, 2010). The task was very simple and the correct solution was 
unambiguous (the exact number of dots was known). For this task, using a simple 
aggregation rule was sufficient in order to reap the benefits of collective cognition. 
In chapter 3 and 4, I showed how individuals increased their decision accuracy 
when facing binary choices, using social information based on others’ reaction to the 
stimuli. It has been shown that even without active signalling or individual recognition, a 
fraction of knowledgeable individuals is able to lead a group (Couzin et al., 2005; Dyer et 
al., 2008), provided that group members have the incentive to stay together. A similar 
mechanism has been shown in golden shiners (Notemigonus chrysoleucas) in an 
experiment in which parts of a tank were randomly shaded or illuminated (Berdahl et al., 
2013). Golden shiners prefer darker areas. The study showed that individuals that were in 
shaded areas swam slower than those in illuminated areas, resulting in the whole group 
turning towards the shaded area. 
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It has been shown however, that some problems require expert knowledge (Krause 
et al., 2010) and in such cases simply aggregating individual decisions can deteriorate 
collective decisions. In such cases, the group might not beat the expert, but all its 
members might benefit from the knowledge shared by the expert. This is known as the 
“pool of competence hypothesis” (Wolf and Krause, 2014). In such cases, reaching a 
consensus decision by discussion can be a better strategy than a simple polling of every 
opinion. Discussion allows indeed to get rid of outliers and a knowledgeable expert can 
expose and explain why a given solution is best. I showed in chapter 5 that when the 
problem to solve is more complex, individuals also benefit from being part of a group. 
The ability of groups to beat even the best individuals has far-reaching implications in 
human health, as doctors are better as a group at diagnosing cancer than even the best of 
them (Kurvers et al., 2015; Wolf et al., 2015). 
The complexity of the experiment presented in chapter 5 reflects better the 
complexity of decisions that humans need to make on a regular basis and discussion may 
be the best way for the moment to make decisions on complex issues. However, 
discussion can be influenced by many factors such as leadership (or at least hierarchy), 
differences in information, personality (for example differences in aggressiveness or 
along the boldness/shyness continuum), and care needs to be taken on how to best 
structure a discussion. In many cases, some information can be lost and the final outcome 
may be worse than if obtained by other aggregation methods, and also worse than at least 
a portion of the group members (Janis, 1982; Lorenz et al., 2011). 
 
Effect of personality and network structure 
Chapter 2 used a simple aggregation, leading to a very democratic decision, preventing 
any effect of personality or network position, or potential bias due to age, sex, race, etc. 
However the studies presented in chapters 3, 4, and 5 could be influenced by such factors. 
The study presented in chapter 4 shows that movement behaviour without vocal 
communication is enough for groups to benefit from their members. It would be 
interesting to have more information about personality differences that affect the group. 
For example, leadership can be associated with boldness (Leblond and Reebs, 2006). 
However, a bold individual would probably not be followed by the rest of the group if 
most of them know about the presence of a predator (Ward et al., 2011). So boldness may 
not always be a predictor of who the leader is. In situations of exploring for new 
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territories or food, boldness/exploration may be associated with leadership. But in case of 
a costly threat, bold leaders are probably not blindly followed. Furthermore, social 
responsiveness, and therefore the use of social information may vary between different 
personalities (Wolf and Krause, 2014). 
It is also important to understand the underlying structure of the group. This can 
be done using social network analysis. As not every group uses completely democratic or 
completely despotic decision-making, the network structure is likely to influence the 
process leading to a group decision. This necessity is illustrated by the “majority illusion” 
(Lerman et al., 2015), in which each individual from a group is under the impression that 
a majority of his companions is in favour of one option, whereas in truth, this option is 
favoured by a minority. This phenomenon is due to the minority members being very well 
connected compared to the majority members. 
 
Outlook and avenues for future research 
I will conclude this chapter with remarks on the future of studies on collective behaviour, 
especially on collective cognition and decision-making. 
Many models try to understand how individuals make decisions, from very simple 
models based on heuristics (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011) to complex models 
delineating the use of social information versus private information (Arganda et al., 
2012). A deeper understanding of the social structure of a group, using social network 
analysis would help understanding the processes underlying collective cognition (Kurvers 
et al., 2014b). Furthermore, we have seen that personality as well can influence group 
structure and should be taken into account when studying group decision-making (Wolf 
and Krause, 2014). 
Recent advances in neuroimaging enabling to examine in real time the firing of 
neurons in the brain of live organisms are promising tools to investigate the underlying 
processes at the brain level during decision-making (Ahrens et al., 2013). Fast 
developments in the field of robotics will allow to test collective decision-making models 
either by integrating robots within groups of animals, or by using autonomous robots 
capable of interacting with each other (Faria et al., 2010b; Knight, 2005; Krause et al., 
2011a). Finally, technologies such as global positioning systems (GPS), acoustic tags or 
radio-frequency identification (RFID) are becoming increasingly smaller and affordable, 
bringing the possibility to track the positions and interactions between numerous 
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individuals and allowing reality mining of animal groups in the wild (Krause et al., 2013). 
These techniques are already being used to study decision-making in primates (King and 
Sueur, 2011), pigeons (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008), ants (Robinson et al., 2009), and sharks 
(Guttridge et al., 2010). 
Beyond understanding how animal groups make collective decisions, 
understanding how humans can improve their decision-making by using swarm 
intelligence is a crucial issue with many applications susceptible to affect our lives, in 
various domains ranging from medicine (Kurvers et al., 2015; Wolf et al., 2015) to 
natural resources management (Arlinghaus and Krause, 2013). 
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